Representing Social Agents, Actions, and Knowledge States at Separate Levels of Explicitness by Herberg, Jonathan
           
  
REPRESENTING SOCIAL AGENTS, ACTIONS, AND KNOWLEDGE STATES AT 
SEPARATE LEVELS OF EXPLICITNESS 
By 
Jonathan Herberg 
 
Dissertation 
Submitted to the Faculty of the  
Graduate School of Vanderbilt University 
in partial fulfillment of the requirements 
for the degree of  
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 
in  
Psychology 
May, 2011 
Nashville, Tennessee 
 
Approved: 
Professor Megan M. Saylor 
Professor Daniel T. Levin 
Professor John J. Rieser 
Professor Gautam Biswas 
 
 
 ii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
                                                                                                                                              Page 
LIST OF TABLES ................................................................................................................... iv 
 
LIST OF FIGURES ...................................................................................................................v 
Chapter 
  
I.     INTRODUCTION ..............................................................................................................1 
 
        Organization of this introduction and dissertation .............................................................4 
    Perceiving and interpreting actions at the sensorimotor level ...........................................6 
    Interpreting actions in terms of overarching intentions ...................................................16 
        Theory level reasoning to guide action perception, explanation, and prediction ............28 
        Summary of the levels of explicitness framework ...........................................................35 
       
II.     ACTION SIMULATION FROM GAZE OBSERVATION ...........................................37 
 
          Experiment 1 ..................................................................................................................39 
                Method .....................................................................................................................40 
                Results ......................................................................................................................43 
                Discussion ................................................................................................................48 
          Experiment 2 ..................................................................................................................49 
                Method .....................................................................................................................50 
                Results ......................................................................................................................52 
                Discussion ................................................................................................................52 
          Experiment 3 ..................................................................................................................54 
                Method .....................................................................................................................55 
                Results ......................................................................................................................57 
                Discussion ................................................................................................................57 
   
III.     SOCIAL HIGHLIGHTING LEADS TO LEARNING INTERFERENCE ...................61 
 
          Imitation teaching: possible costs and benefits to the teacher .......................................61 
          Experiment 1 ..................................................................................................................64 
                Method .....................................................................................................................65 
                Results ......................................................................................................................68 
                Discussion ................................................................................................................68 
          Experiment 2 ..................................................................................................................71 
                Method .....................................................................................................................71 
                Results ......................................................................................................................72 
                Discussion ................................................................................................................73 
          Experiment 3 ..................................................................................................................75 
 iii 
                Method .....................................................................................................................75 
                Results and Discussion ............................................................................................77 
          Chapter III Discussion ...................................................................................................77 
 
IV.     CONCLUSIONS ...........................................................................................................82 
 
REFERENCES ........................................................................................................................89 
 
 
 
 
  
 iv 
LIST OF TABLES 
 
 
 
 
Table                            Page 
 
1.     Multiple regression for predicting 4-ring solution time  
        for Experiments 1 and 2 ...................................................................................................74 
 
2.     Multiple regression for predicting 4-ring number of steps 
        for Experiments 1 and 2 ...................................................................................................74 
 
 
 
  
 v 
 
LIST OF FIGURES 
 
 
 
Figure                            Page 
 
1.     Sketch of the Levels of Explicitness framework for action analysis  ..............................33 
 
2.     Mean invalid minus valid trial reach duration and reach deceleration time  
        differences for Experiment 1, same-color condition ........................................................45 
 
3.     Mean invalid minus valid trial reach duration and reach deceleration time  
        differences for Experiment 1, different-color condition ..................................................45 
 
4.     Mean overall invalid minus valid trial reach duration and reach deceleration time  
        differences for Experiment 1 ...........................................................................................47 
 
5.     Mean invalid minus valid trial reach duration and reach deceleration time    
        differences for Experiment 1, first trial block ..................................................................47 
 
6.     Basic setup for Experiment 2, showing the subject‘s view of the model‘s reach 
        for the large cube object in the transparent condition ......................................................51 
 
7.     Mean invalid minus valid trial reach duration and reach deceleration time    
        differences for Experiment 2, transparent condition ........................................................53 
 
8.     Mean invalid minus valid trial reach duration and reach deceleration time    
        differences for Experiment 2, opaque condition ..............................................................53 
 
9.     Basic setup for Experiment 3, showing the subject‘s view of the model‘s reach 
        for the large cube object in the transparent screen condition ...........................................56 
 
10.   Mean invalid minus valid trial reach duration and reach deceleration time   
        differences for Experiment 3, transparent screen condition ............................................58 
 
11.   Mean invalid minus valid trial reach duration and reach deceleration time    
        differences for Experiment 3, opaque screen condition ...................................................58 
 
12.   Mean 4-ring and 3-ring Tower of Hanoi solution times for  
        Experiments 1, 2, and 3....................................................................................................69 
 
13.   Mean 4-ring and 3-ring Tower of Hanoi number of steps for  
        Experiments 1, 2, and 3....................................................................................................69
 1 
CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The perceptual stimulus corresponding to an action consists of a continuous stream of 
motion information. Yet, in our perceptual and conceptual processing we not only organize 
actions into discrete units (e.g., Newtson 1977; Zacks, Tversky, & Iyer, 2001), we also 
interpret actions as meaningful and directed toward achieving intentions on the basis of 
beliefs and desires (e.g., Dennett, 1997). We are capable of analyzing action at different 
levels of abstraction. For example, consider someone preparing a pot of coffee. An observer 
who has no knowledge or experience making coffee would still be able to perceive her 
actions in terms of the immediate goals manifest in each motor act (e.g., grasping the pot, 
turning on the water faucet, etc.). We also have the capacity to represent the actions at a 
higher level if we take into account the larger, overarching intentions implied by separate 
motor acts (e.g., the intention to move a stool to reach and open a cabinet to obtain a fresh 
filter to put into the coffee machine). At the highest level of abstractness we can represent 
actions in terms of epistemic mental states. For example, if we see the actor reach for a 
higher cabinet door to obtain a clean filter, even though we know the filters have previously 
been moved to a lower cabinet, we have the capacity to represent her actions, and 
overarching intention, in terms of her false representation of the location of the filters. 
 A general outline of how human action analysis is accomplished will need to account 
for the cognitive processes and representations supporting our perception and understanding 
of actions at these different levels. A basic issue that such a framework must detail is the 
 2 
interplay between bottom-up and top-down processes in action analysis. That is, it should 
answer the question of whether analysis at lower levels only feeds forward to influence 
higher-level processing, or whether top-down processes (i.e., higher-level action 
interpretations based on knowledge) can influence lower-levels of processing. Related to this, 
it should give an account of how we both determine goals from seeing actions, and predict 
actions from knowing goals (Csibra & Gergely, 2007). A general framework would also need 
to detail whether and how we covertly experience (simulate) an agent‘s perspective versus 
reason on the basis of general, abstract, causal principles (i.e., a theory) to calculate the 
intentions, desires, and beliefs motivating actions. It would also need to define specifically 
how these systems work separately and in conjunction to organize and drive our perception 
and understanding of actions. 
 The current paper explores these issues in relation to the two main theoretical 
paradigms that have been put forth to account for our ability to interpret and predict others‘ 
actions: simulation theory and theory of mind. Simulation theory postulates that people use 
their own sensory and motor systems to covertly re-create an agent‘s experiences, 
perceptions, and actions to understand the observed actions (Goldman, 2006, 2001; Gordon, 
1996, 1992). According to the theory of mind framework we reason about behavior in terms 
of a coherent set of causal-explanatory inferential principles, formed on the basis of prior 
action observation. These principles are abstract and so can generate action predictions in 
novel situations (Gopnik & Wellman, 1992). Simulation theory and the theory of mind 
framework have often been discussed as competing explanations for our action interpretation 
capabilities (e.g., Goldman, 2001; Gopnik & Wellman, 1992). More recent views have 
attempted to make room for both theories by claiming that sometimes we use simulation 
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procedures and sometimes we reason in terms of a theory (e.g., Nichols & Stich, 2003). 
However, partly because of the generality and loose nature with which each kind of process 
has been defined, it has been difficult to obtain conclusive falsification or confirmation of 
either theory for any given action analysis task. For instance, some argue that any inference 
of mental states, whether a conscious process or completely inaccessible to consciousness, 
should count as a theory of mind process (e.g., Stich & Nichols, 1992). But such a definition 
is so broad that it would be difficult to imagine what kind of process wouldn’t count as a 
theory. On the other hand, often little distinction is made between automatic, unconscious 
motor simulation and conscious imaginative simulation, as if support for the former self-
evidently counts as support for the latter (e.g., Gallese, Fadiga, Fogassi, & Rizolatti, 1996; 
Gallese & Goldman, 1998). But the route from motor resonance to conscious reasoning, and 
in particular to the calculation and use of an actor‘s belief states when they differ from the 
observer‘s, is left unspecified in such accounts. These issues have led some to view the 
whole theory vs. simulation debate as relatively fruitless (e.g., Apperly, 2008). I would argue 
that the concepts from each framework are useful if we move the focus away from 
determining whether one versus the other kind of theory applies for a given action, and 
instead detail which aspects of our capacity to perceive and understand actions each theory 
accounts, or fails to account for. Based on such a sketch of their functions it then becomes 
possible to identify specific points of interaction between simulation and theory processes 
(cf. Saxe, 2005). An example of this kind of approach is the notion of ―anchoring‖ and 
―adjustment,‖ the proposal that to engage in perspective taking for the purpose of predicting 
how others will act in specific situations we adjust our initial egocentric simulations of 
actions to incorporate theory-based inferences of how the actor‘s mental states will differ 
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from one‘s own. This proposal has generated useful questions and research testing the ways 
in which these adjustments are made in the context of predicting how others will, for 
example, interpret ambiguous messages (e.g., Epley, Keysar, Boven, & Gilovich, 2004). In 
order to determine other ways in which simulation and theory processes interact, in particular 
in the context of guiding one‘s online perception and interpretation of another‘s action, 
requires detailing the action analysis capacities each kind of process by itself can and cannot 
account for. This requires first that we make strict definitions delineating what counts as any 
kind of simulation or theory process. Doing so allows us to first separate out two kinds of 
simulation: low-level sensorimotor simulation and higher-level imaginative simulative 
reasoning. While the latter is related to the former, it is a distinct form of simulation. 
Additionally in my view, to count as a theory-level inference, the theory must be accessible 
to consciousness (otherwise any process, even simulation processes, could count as a theory). 
Once these distinct processes are separated out, it becomes possible to define and measure 
how simulation and theory processes work separately and in tandem to drive action analysis.  
 
Organization of this Introduction and Dissertation 
 My goal in this introductory chapter is to integrate simulation and theory of mind 
approaches to action analysis by positing that we process action at different levels of 
abstractness. The proposal is that we construct different kinds of representations to support 
our perception, prediction, and interpretation of actions at these separate levels. First, our 
sensorimotor system for producing motor acts has the capacity to automatically resonate with 
perceived actions. Thus, representations of others‘ motor acts in terms of automatic 
sensorimotor simulation constitutes a base to guide our action perception. This capacity can 
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allow us to predict immediate goals and motions, but more distant goals, and representations 
incorporating an actor‘s knowledge states is beyond what this capacity can accomplish. 
Therefore, at the next level, that of deliberate simulative reasoning, our further capacity to 
simulate an actor‘s intentions, perceptions, and planning of actions allows us to extend and 
elaborate on the basic capacity for sensorimotor simulation in order to interpret larger scale 
actions in terms of overarching intentions and non-immediate goals. Representations at this 
level are built from the same representations constructed at the level of sensorimotor 
simulation, but with greater flexibility. Finally, at the most abstract level, by explicitly 
recognizing and labeling the actor‘s mental states in terms of a coherent theory of mind we 
can infer actions on the basis of rule-based logical reasoning, and apart from simulating the 
actions and the actor‘s mental states. 
This framework of action representation at multiple levels is partially motivated by a 
general model of cognition known as ―representational redescription‖ (Karmiloff-Smith, 
1992). This model posits that, during the course of development, operations in any given 
cognitive domain undergo processes of ―redescription,‖ with operational commonalities and 
links being made more explicit, available to flexibly reason with, and accessible to 
consciousness and language at the higher levels. In contrast, operations at lower levels are 
inaccessible to consciousness, inflexible, automatic and fast.  
The organization of this chapter is as follows. First, the processes supporting action 
analysis at the sensorimotor level are described. These are the most basic processes guiding 
our perception of actions. They in turn lay the groundwork for the next level of action 
representation, in terms of the actor‘s intentions and perceptions. At the highest level, we 
employ abstract explanatory principles for predicting and interpreting actions. This level can 
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be described as a theory-based approach to action analysis. After outlining the nature of our 
action representations at these three levels, the next two chapters apply this ―levels of 
explicitness‖ (LOE) framework to interpreting the results of two separate sets of experiments 
relating to how we perceive and represent a social agent‘s actions and knowledge. The first 
set of experiments explores our capacity to predict motor acts from gaze, and tests whether 
specific situations push our action analysis system to go beyond automatic sensorimotor 
simulation processes in order to incorporate knowledge simulation. The second set of 
experiments suggests that certain kinds social behaviors involved in demonstrating actions 
may impede one‘s encoding and learning. After using aspects of the LOE framework to 
interpret the findings of each of these sets of experiments, in the concluding chapter I discuss 
the different kinds of representations of social agents‘ actions and knowledge states that these 
results point to, and how other aspects of the LOE framework may be tested to disentangle 
when these representations are used. 
 
Perceiving and Interpreting Actions at the Sensorimotor Level 
If we consider the most basic perception of an action, stripped of elaborate 
interpretations such as cognitive motivations or the intentions manifest in the action, we are 
left with sequences of body movements. Initial approaches to understanding the processes 
driving our perception of such stimuli have treated the problem purely as a visual analysis 
one, in which the visual perception system computes the relevant kinematic and dynamic 
information, and there was no consideration of the possibility of a role for motor brain areas 
in guiding our perception (e.g., Runeson, 1983). However, a considerable amount of 
behavioral and neural evidence has since established that brain areas dedicated to producing 
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our own body movements, and processing the sensory feedback from the movements we 
make, are also recruited for perceiving others‘ motions (Blakemore & Decety, 2001; Grush, 
2004; Wilson & Knoblich, 2005). The current section will give a brief description of some of 
this evidence, and develop the proposal that sensorimotor simulation allows for rapid, 
automatic perceptual predictions. We simulate the motor acts we see, their sensory effects, 
and movements likely to immediately follow current movements. In seeing how far 
automatic sensorimotor simulation can take us, models of how sensorimotor simulation is 
driven and the functions it serves, as well as the limitations such models face in accounting 
for the full range of human action analysis abilities, will be discussed. 
 
Motor Brain Areas Selectively Activated for Perceiving Biomechanical Motion 
 A perceptual phenomenon discovered by Shiffrar & Freyd (1990, 1993) supports the 
idea that motor simulation plays a role in the perception of biomechanical motions. In this 
study, subjects were shown serially displayed images of human body postures, thereby 
causing them to perceive apparent motion from one posture to the other. However, the 
specific motion path between the two postures subjects perceived depended on the time 
interval between the images. For example, subjects were shown a hand on one side of a bent 
knee in apparent motion to the other side. At short time intervals between the two images, 
they saw the hand move through the knee. This is a direct but biomechanically impossible 
motion path. At longer time intervals they saw the hand move around the knee. Perceiving 
this indirect, biomechanically possible motion path depends on a time-interval that is more in 
line with making the movement. A brain imaging study indicates that brain areas for motor 
production are selectively activated for perceiving the biomechanically possible apparent 
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motion path (Stevens, Fonlupt, Shiffrar, & Decety, 2000). These include the premotor cortex 
and supplementary motor area.  
 
Observation-Execution Interference 
Another basic line of evidence establishing that motor simulation processes are 
recruited in our perceptual processing of actions comes from findings of interference effects 
between observed and executed movements. Observation-execution interference effects can 
run in either direction, with perception interfering with a motor task, or vice-versa. Examples 
of perception interfering with motor tasks include findings of movement disturbances and 
movement onset delays caused by the perception of basic arm or finger movements (Kilner, 
2003; Brass, Bekkering, & Prinz, 2001). These studies suggest that  perceiving simple motor 
acts automatically elicits activation in the brain areas for producing such motions. As an 
example of a motor task interfering with perception, people are more prone to errors in their 
perceptual judgments of the weights of boxes they observe others lift when they themselves 
are concurrently engaged in a box-lifting act (Hamilton, 2004). These effects suggest that the 
system for perceptually calculating weights uses motor resources for executing lifts. 
Therefore they likewise demonstrate that the processes supporting the production of basic 
motor acts are automatically recruited when perceiving others execute such actions.   
 
Motor Simulation for Perceptual Prediction 
The questions suggested from the evidence of motor simulation concerns its specific 
functions, and the aspects of action analysis that can and cannot be accounted for by such 
functions. Several studies suggest that this motor system activation is involved in simulating 
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the motor execution of the observed action and also in simulating, thereby predicting, 
immediate future motor acts. The role of the motor system in perceptual prediction is 
highlighted in a task requiring subjects to predict future cursive letter strokes from an 
observed letter stroke (Kandel, 2000). Biomechanical motion tends to approximate a curve-
velocity relationship known as the two-thirds power law. In this study, subjects‘ predictions 
of the next letter stroke were more accurate the closer the observed letter stroke curve was in 
accordance with this law. This suggests that accurate perceptual prediction depends on the 
degree to which one is motorically capable of executing the observed motion pattern. This 
fits with the notion that motor simulation drives perceptual prediction. Furthermore, 
experiments examining how observing another person‘s reach or gaze toward an object 
impacts one‘s own reaches suggest that the motor system is recruited to simulate not only 
observed reaches, but also potential reaches as indicated by gaze (e.g., Castiello, 2003; 
Edwards, Humphreys, & Castiello, 2003). This evidence implies that we regularly run 
automatic motor simulations of potential actions as part of our perceptual processing. Our 
motor system is used to simulate motor acts we see, to simulate and predict acts likely to 
immediately follow these, and to simulate potential actions. 
 
Simulation of Motor Acts Plus Sensory Effects 
A motor act‘s sensory effects correspond to incoming sensory information about the 
results of the act. These may include proprioceptive, tactile, and visual effects. Consider the 
sensory effects associated with picking up a glass of water as a concrete example (borrowed 
from Blakemore & Decety, 2001). Sensory effects of this motor act would include the feel of 
the grip force applied to the glass, the weight of the glass, the kinematic feedback from the 
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arm, as well as the sight of the glass going up with the hand. Another function of motor 
simulation appears to be to simulate such sensory feedback. Such a function is specified by 
the common-coding framework, which postulates that our early coding of to-be-executed 
actions is in terms of the environmental events anticipated to flow from the actions, and our 
late perceptual coding is also in terms of environmental events (e.g., Prinz, 1990). Therefore 
action plans and perceptual events (i.e., sensory effects) share the same cognitive codes at 
some phase of the processing of each. Mirror neurons, first demonstrated in the ventral 
premotor cortex of the macaque monkey (Gallese et al., 1996), may instantiate such a 
common code. They are active for executing specific simple motor acts, such as grasping an 
object, and in perceptually processing the same acts in others. Evidence for a mirror neuron 
system in humans includes muscle-specific motor system activation during observation of 
specific hand and arm acts (Fadiga, Fogassi, Pavesi, & Rizzolatti, 1995).  
 It is important however to carefully define the scope of actions the common-coding 
framework deals with. Namely, the paradigm is supported by studies involving simple, well 
defined motor acts such as pressing a key, and simple, well defined and immediate effects 
such as a tone (Hommel, Musseler, Aschersleben, & Prinz, 2001). The question left open is 
how the framework, and sensorimotor simulation in general, can ―scale-up‖ to more 
complicated multiple-step action sequences with multiple effects, and whether we predict 
more distant effects of an action with the same mechanisms.  
 
Models of Action Analysis in Terms of Sensorimotor Simulation 
To begin to draw a clearer picture of how we perceive and interpret actions, including 
those on a larger scale, details on the specific functions automatic sensorimotor simulation 
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may serve, as well as the action analysis processes that may lie beyond its capacities, need to 
be drawn out. Several related models of the functioning of automatic sensorimotor simulation 
processes in action analysis have been proposed; however, as they all rely on strictly 
established, preset actions with predictable direct effects, they may overstate the ability of 
such mechanisms in the absence of higher-level processes to deal with the full range of the 
human capacity for action analysis.  
One proposal stipulates that we become aware of the basic, low-level intentions 
motivating motor acts through automatic simulation (Blakemore & Decety, 2001). For 
simplicity I will refer to these low-level intentions, specifying the direct, proximate goal of a 
motor act, as motor intentions. Considering their example of observing someone lift a glass 
of water, an internal simulation of this motor act would allow the observer‘s prior 
experiences of executing similar acts to be involved in registering what the actor‘s motor 
intention might be. That is, if the observer has a history of being motivated to execute a 
similar motor act in the context of fulfilling the intention of taking a drink, he would register 
this intention in the actor.     
 This framework is built around the idea of a forward model for predicting the sensory 
consequences of one‘s own actions. The idea here is that as we execute motor acts, the 
forward model predicts what the sensory consequences are going to be prior to the brain 
receiving the actual sensory inflow. This predictive process attenuates the incoming sensory 
signal, which serves as a cue for which actions are self-generated. When perceiving others‘ 
actions, the proposal is that one‘s forward model can work in reverse, and register motor acts 
associated with observed sensory effects.  
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A more elaborated version of this model is that an emulator for human movement, 
which is a system that includes a forward model that predicts sensory feedback, runs in 
parallel to motions one perceives others make (Wilson & Knoblich, 2005). This amounts to 
activation of the observer‘s motor production systems (i.e., motor simulation) to guide our 
perception of human motions, perceptually fill-in unseen movements, and to continually 
generate online perceptual predictions of motions before they occur. 
 While these models make sense in simple contexts involving intentions tied directly 
to motor acts, i.e. intentions-in-action (Searle, 1983), they fail to specify how we would 
understand longer action sequences in terms of the overarching motivating the sequence, 
rather than the motor intention tied directly to a single motor act. For instance, it is easy 
imagine such an automatic triggering of one‘s forward model to lead one to a direct motor 
intention that is incorrect. If someone is picking up the glass of water, for example, in order 
to mix it with medicinal powder and give the concoction to her grandfather, our action 
analysis system has to have the flexibility to adapt in order to generate an understanding of 
the action on a more abstract basis. Similarly, these models fail to account for our capacity to 
relate motor acts that achieve a subgoal to the larger goal. For instance, returning to the 
coffee making example, if we see the actor reach for a stool we can relate that motor act not 
just to its direct effects, but to the larger goal of reaching a highly positioned cabinet, and the 
larger goal still of obtaining a clean filter, and finally to the ultimate goal of making coffee. 
We see the motor act of reaching for a stool not only in its own terms but as a means to a 
more distant end, i.e., in terms of not only a motor intention but an overarching intention. 
Finally, the limitations of such models are most starkly highlighted when we consider, in the 
coffee-making example, the use of a stool to obtain a filter as motivated by a false belief of 
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the filter‘s location. Automatic sensorimotor simulation processes have never been defined 
with a capacity to ―consider‖ counterfactual states of the world. Even though such models 
can explain our perception of lower-level motor intentions efficiently, explaining how we 
interpret actions in terms of overarching intentions, as opposed to direct motor intentions, 
and in terms of false beliefs, lie beyond the scope of what any model of action analysis in 
terms of automatic sensorimotor simulation, on its own, is able to account for. 
 
Sensorimotor-Based Event Models For Action Parsing 
At this point it would be illustrative to relate the forgoing account of sensorimotor 
simulation in action analysis to the Event Segmentation Theory (EST) framework (Kurby & 
Zacks, 2008; Zacks, Speer, Swallow, & Braver, 2007). EST is a model of how our perceptual 
system parses the continuous stream of action into distinct units, or parts. This constitutes a 
critical basic achievement of the perceptual and conceptual processing of actions (e.g., 
Baldwin & Baird, 1999, 2001; Newtson 1976; Zacks, Tversky, & Iyer, 2001, Zacks et al., 
2007). To return to the example with which I opened this chapter, if we see someone making 
a cup of coffee, we might represent the action sequence as composed of the following units: 
washing out the pot and placing it back in the machine, putting a clean filter into the 
machine, filling the machine with water, putting the ground coffee into the filter, and turning 
on the machine. Our parsing of actions into discrete units is necessary for coherent action 
perception. 
One consideration is that we have the capacity to parse action at coarser or finer 
segmentation grains. The units identified above in the coffee making example correspond to 
a coarse-grain parsing. A fine-grain parsing would break down the action into smaller units. 
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For example, the action unit of putting ground coffee into the filter can be broken down into 
the following finer units: grasping the can of ground coffee and bringing it closer, pulling off 
the lid of the can, grabbing a table spoon, scooping up ground coffee from the can with the 
spoon and putting it into the filter.  
According to EST, our processing of action occurs at multiple grains (coarse and fine) 
simultaneously. We represent what is happening in an action at the multiple timescales 
through ―event models.‖ These event models guide perceptual processing and generate 
perceptual predictions. They are only themselves influenced by perceptual input during the 
transient time intervals of significantly raised prediction error. Prediction error refers to the 
deviation between the perceptual predictions the event models generate and the actual 
incoming perceptual input. When the error rises to a high level, the action becomes 
unpredictable. When this happens, an action unit breakpoint is identified, and perceptual 
information is triggered to come in to reset the event models, to guide perception of the next 
action unit.  
Similar to models of action analysis based on automatic sensorimotor simulation, the 
EST framework can account for our basic perceptual processing of actions, but leaves 
unspecified how we go from this base to understand actions in terms of overarching 
intentions, and abstract mental states. That is, it proposes that event models function and are 
updated automatically, not requiring deliberate attention. This kind of process can explain 
how our perceptual system identifies breakpoints between separate action units. But to 
represent several fine-grained action units in terms of how and why they link up to form a 
coarse grained unit requires representing overarching intentions and non-direct goals, and 
therefore requires deliberate attention and reasoning. For example, EST explains how we 
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perceive, e.g., reaching for a stool as a distinct motor act from putting a filter into the coffee 
machine. But explaining how we represent reaching for a stool as a means to putting a filter 
into the machine requires that we deliberately reason about the action units we see. This is 
even more the case when the observer knows (but the actor doesn‘t know) that there are no 
filters in the cabinet she is using the stool to reach for.      
My proposal therefore is that at the very fine grains of action analysis the event 
models we use are grounded in sensorimotor simulation. At the finest grain, consisting of 
individual motor acts, sensorimotor simulation predicts action effects. At the next grain, 
consisting of associative sequences of motor acts, sensorimotor simulation predicts motor 
acts to follow the one currently being perceived. Understanding why and how these units link 
up into coarser grains requires further processing of these representations. 
Sensorimotor simulation therefore forms the ground base on which more abstract 
action interpretations can be built. At the same time, taken by itself it is rather limited in its 
action analysis capacity. As suggested by Csibra & Gergely (2007), the success of 
associative mechanisms, which according to my proposal are implemented via sensorimotor 
simulation, in predicting goals and actions accurately depends first on seeing repeated 
instantiations of the same motor act sequences. If one encounters a novel action (e.g., a goal 
achieved in a different way) one could only parse it into the smallest atoms, the individual 
motor acts. One would not be able to represent how these motor acts group into a larger 
action via stored sensorimotor associations alone. 
   
 16 
Interpreting Actions in Terms of Overarching Intentions 
 Accounting for our flexibility in inferring non-immediate goals and overarching 
intentions and our ability to incorporate the actor‘s perceptions and knowledge when we see 
novel actions goes beyond the capacity of associative processes and purely automatic 
sensorimotor simulation alone. More generative reasoning processes are needed to explain 
these abilities. In my LOE framework at the level above associative sensorimotor simulation, 
we run more imaginative, consciously driven simulations to reason in terms of the actor‘s 
perceptions and mental states. This form of simulation, which I will refer to as ―imaginative 
simulation‖ or ―simulative reasoning,‖ is built on and tied to sensorimotor simulation 
processes. But it pushes our action analysis skills beyond the capacity for coherent perception 
of actions involving sequences we have previously been repeatedly exposed to. It allows us 
to see such sequences in terms of overarching intentions, to generate meaningful 
interpretations of actions, and in addition to acquire action knowledge when being exposed to 
novel actions. 
 
Imaginative Simulation 
 Proposals of how simulation in this more deliberate, controlled sense functions (as 
contrasted with the automatic sensorimotor simulation) accounts for observers‘ explanations 
and predictions of actions by postulating that they imaginatively take on the actor‘s 
perspective. This corresponds to a consciously controlled process, in which one experiences 
model mental states corresponding to the actor‘s perceptions, intentions, emotions, etc. In the 
context of explaining and predicting actions, one‘s own action planning and reasoning 
processes are engaged. One framework developed along these lines postulates that our 
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default mode of simulation is to make a total projection of our psychology (i.e., perceptions, 
desires, knowledge, etc.) onto the actor. Only if such a total projection fails to account for the 
actions we are perceiving do we start making adjustments to the simulation (Gordon, 1992). 
To borrow an example from that paper to help clarify what is meant here, imagine walking 
along a hiking trail with a friend, who suddenly and instantly turns around and starts walking 
the other way. Failing to account for this action by total projection (i.e., by projecting what 
you were seeing in the environment as you were walking), you make the following 
adjustment in your imagination. You imagine standing where your friend was, and you start 
scanning the environment for features to explain your friend‘s action (from that imagined 
location). With these adjustments made, you now see an approaching bear. This causes you 
to feel an urge to turn around, and this explains your friend‘s sudden behavior. These are 
examples of spatial and perceptual adjustments. Other kinds of adjustments are for desires 
and beliefs. The point is, when total projection of your own situation onto your friend 
becomes unreliable for predicting and explaining his actions, you make adjustments in your 
imagination and project the resulting simulative mental states onto your friend until your 
explanations and predictions of his actions become reliable again. 
 This example also highlights another aspect of imaginative simulation that goes 
beyond automatic sensorimotor simulation. One explains and predicts others‘ behaviors by 
taking into account their perceptions. This involves taking their perspective in one‘s 
imagination and seeing what they see. In other words, one attempts to recreate their 
perceptions in one‘s own mind, and then in one‘s imagination engage in actions based on 
these perceptions. This highlights the notion that simulative reasoning to explain and predict 
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actions is fundamentally an interactive, activity, as opposed to a passive, non-engaging 
process.  
 
Overarching Intentions Distinguished from Motor Intentions 
 At this point it would be helpful to clarify similarities and differences in what I mean 
by ―intention‖ in the context of imaginative simulative reasoning versus in the prior section. 
The discussion of sensorimotor simulation and association processes referred to what I called 
―motor intentions.‖ These are low-level intentions that come to be directly associated with 
particular motor acts. For example, we associate seeing an arm move toward a door to open it 
with the motor intention of opening the door. In an important sense our realization of this 
intention is not separate from the perception of the motor act itself. Motor intentions become 
incorporated into our representations of motor acts, so that we directly perceive them in 
perceiving the motor act rather than need to infer them (Jeannerod, 2004). But they are 
limited in their predictive and interpretive scope. They do not really move us to see beyond 
the motor act itself, or to situate it into an explanation of why the actor is engaging in the 
motor acts one is perceiving. Other sensorimotor association processes do allow us to 
anticipate motor acts following the one we are seeing, so that we perceive the sequence as a 
coherent action unit, but again don‘t let us know why they go together. Addressing the why 
question requires processes that calculate the overarching intention in a stream of action. This 
allows us to see the motor act units as constituting a means to causally bring about the 
ultimate goal. These processes allow us to form a meaningful interpretation of actions we 
observe, including novel actions. 
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Simulative Reasoning for Imitation Learning 
A model of the structure of intentional action which gives a sense of what I mean by 
overarching intention postulates that people form intentions as action plans to achieve goals 
(see Tomasello et al., 2005). A goal is a person‘s representation of a desired state of the 
world. One formulates an action plan, or intention, to effect a goal on the basis of one‘s 
knowledge and skills, and one‘s model of the external world. A person engaging in 
intentional action perceptually monitors the external world to see if his or her actions are 
achieving the intended results.  
Imitation learning is a special form of learning in humans. The learner observes a 
model engaging in novel actions, and from this learns a novel goal and a novel means (action 
plan) to obtain the goal (Tomasello, Kruger, & Rather, 1993). In short, the observer infers the 
model‘s overarching intention for a novel action sequence, and then internalizes both the 
actor‘s ultimate goal in producing the actions, and the means by which the actor causally 
brought about the goal. In this way the observer acquires a new means for a new goal. To 
appreciate more fully what imitation learning requires, it is illustrative to contrast imitation 
with two simpler forms of replicating the actor‘s goal or means: emulation and mimicry. In 
learning by emulation, the learner picks up the actor‘s novel goal but does not internalize the 
actor‘s strategy or means for bringing about the goal. Instead the learner figures out how to 
achieve the goal his or her own way. In mimicry, on the other hand, the learner simply 
blindly copies the means (i.e., motor acts), without representing anything about the actor‘s 
perspective or goal. Imitation learning may be unique to humans, at least compared to 
animals not enculturated in human environments. For example, one study showed evidence 
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for imitation learning in human infants, whereas several ape species exhibited evidence for 
learning by emulation only (Tennie, Call, & Tomasello, 2006).   
Imitation learning requires the learner to engage in learning a novel action sequence 
from the actor‘s perspective. It is not a passive or non-interactive process in which the learner 
simply picks up the actions and goals without engaging in problem-solving and reasoning 
from the actor‘s perspective. As phrased by Tomasello (1993), cultural learning processes, of 
which imitation learning is the most basic kind, entails learning through rather than by 
another individual. As such, this phenomenon highlights further limitations of automatic 
sensorimotor simulation as a general account of action analysis. Sensorimotor simulation by 
itself fails to specify how we incorporate an actor‘s differing knowledge states and 
perspective into our representation of his actions. As seen in the discussion of models 
relating to sensorimotor simulation, such abilities go beyond the capacity of purely automatic 
processes, instead requiring conscious attention. These ideas appear to fit with the notion that 
deliberate imaginative simulation is the driving force behind our capacity for imitation 
learning.  
When we see an actor engaging in novel actions, our own action planning and 
reasoning systems become engaged in the task of explaining and predicting the novel actions. 
Following the framework for imaginative simulation by Gordon (1992), when we see actions 
we are unable to account for we adjust our imaginative projection onto the actor to take into 
account his perspective. This requires first a capacity to calculate the actor‘s perceptions (i.e., 
what he is seeing). When these perceptions are run through our action planning systems, they 
allow us to make guesses at the actor‘s ultimate goal. This is how imaginative simulation 
accounts for our capacity to infer goals from seeing actions (Csibra & Gergely, 2007). Now 
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to predict actions expected to flow from a goal, simulative reasoning involves acting out 
means to the goal, but in one‘s imagination rather than reality. Just as if we were engaging in 
the actions ourselves, we typically simulate actions that serve as rational means to the goal. 
That is, we attempt to find action means that are not more effortful than they need to be to 
achieve the goal, given the constraints of the environment on which actions are allowed (cf. 
―the rationality principle‖ of Csibra & Gergely, 2003). If our simulated actions are failing to 
account for what we see the actor doing, we make further adjustments to the imaginative 
simulation we project onto the actor. In this way we take in the actor‘s perceptions and make 
other adjustments to attempt to engage in the same reasoning processes that the actor is. This 
is how we incorporate the actor‘s perspective, goal, and means into our representations of 
actions, including novel actions. 
 
Imaginative Simulations Built from Sensorimotor Associations 
To account for how imaginative simulation is achieved, I propose that it is tied to 
sensorimotor simulation in the following manner. When we engage in actions in our 
imagination, this corresponds to activating motor areas in our brain for executing the actions, 
as well as brain areas for perceiving the action effects. Some support for this claim is given 
by Jeannerod (2001), who identifies a common neural network involved in a range of action-
related cognition, including action planning, action imagination, and action observation. For 
example, imagining, observing, and engaging in actions all activate overlapping areas in the 
premotor cortex, cerebellum, and posterior parietal cortex. Imagining actions such as rotating 
blocks engages the visual areas of the brain (Kosslyn, 2001; Farah, 1988). 
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This evidence is consistent with the idea that imagining an action in part entails 
sending out motor commands for executing it, which brings with it an imagination of the 
sensory and visual effects of the action. The actual execution is inhibited, but representations 
of sensory and visual effects associated with the motor acts get activated in response. These 
associations are built automatically from extensive prior experience of particular sensory 
effects associated with particular motor acts (as discussed in the section on sensorimotor 
simulation). These in turn allow us to anticipate the effects of actions when we imagine 
carrying them out. If we did not have stored associations between motor acts and their 
effects, then imagining engaging in particular motor acts would not give us any basis to 
imagine the effects of the actions. Imaginative simulation of the actor‘s motor acts would 
then be nearly useless. Instead, with these associations we can imaginative simulate extended 
actions and their resulting cumulative effects. We can simulate causal chains of action to 
reach a desired goal. Therefore, associations between motor acts and their effects support our 
capacity to simulatively engage in observed actions, which supports our explanation and 
prediction in terms of overarching intentions. 
 
Building Event Models By Simulative Reasoning 
In the section on sensorimotor simulation I related automatic simulation at the level 
of motor acts and sensory effects to Event Segmentation Theory (Zacks et al., 2007). I 
postulated that in our perception of action we use event models based on stored associations 
between motor acts in our sensorimotor system for making perceptual predictions and 
parsing actions into fine units consisting of associated motor acts. Here I turn to the question 
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of how simulative reasoning can build on this, allowing us to interpret the coarse units as 
meaningful and explained on the basis of intentions, and to deal with novel action sequences.  
 The discussion of imitation learning suggests specific limitations in the EST model of 
action parsing. In that framework, event models for both fine and coarse parsing of action 
occur automatically in the perceptual processing of the action. That is, while one can attend 
to different grains the actual parsing into the different grains occurs effortlessly. My 
suggestion, on the other hand would be that an understanding of action in terms of its coarse 
units requires understanding why the units comprising a given unit go together, and therefore 
involves a deliberate, effortful representation of the action in terms of the actor‘s overarching 
intentions and knowledge states. That is, while the unit boundaries for both coarse and fine 
units are detected automatically in the course of perceptual processing, representing a 
sequence of fine units as comprising a coarse grain requires effortful reasoning and attention.  
 In some circumstances this sort of effortful reasoning entails logical calculations in 
terms of abstract rules of inference based on explicitly denoted mental state concepts, and 
one‘s understanding of their causal relations. This route of inference, which is termed theory-
level reasoning in the LOE framework, will be detailed shortly, in the next section. However 
the LOE framework also incorporates a more pragmatically based means of how action 
representation in terms of an actor‘s overarching intentions and mental states is achieved. 
Namely, it involves the observer taking on the actor‘s mental states and reasoning in his 
imagination, and engaging in action planning and problem solving from the actor‘s 
perspective. That this form of simulative reasoning is a typical feature of action analysis is 
supported by a wide array of circumstances in which we predict and interpret others‘ actions 
without fully taking into account how the actor‘s knowledge is false or differs from our own 
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(e.g., Epley et al., 2004; Nickerson, 1999). Such failures in the ability to fully block one‘s 
own knowledge states has been termed the ―curse of knowledge,‖ as sometimes one‘s 
accurate knowledge about a situation will impede one‘s accurate interpretation and 
predictions of others‘ actions (Birch & Bloom, 2004). These findings fit in naturally with the 
notion that we regularly predict what an actor will do by simulating the reasoning, planning, 
and actions he is experiencing and executing, but often fail to ―quarantine‖ our own 
knowledge away from our imaginative simulations (cf. Goldman, 2006). There is no 
immediately apparent reason why these findings would occur if detached, theory-based 
inferences serve as the only means for such mental-state reasoning, but make sense if we 
regularly employ a more deliberate form of reasoning that is an extension of and elaboration 
on our capacity for senorimotor simulation.     
 The proposal therefore is that at the level of simulative reasoning, we actively 
construct representations of an actor‘s strategy, plans, and goals by flexibly and deliberately 
combining the event models which at lower levels are used to automatically guide our 
perception of actions. This forms a different type of event model, one based on deliberate 
simulative reasoning, and contrasts with simply activating pre-made event models (consisting 
of stored associations between motor acts, and between motor acts and effects), like we do at 
the level of sensorimotor simulation for purely fine-grained action analysis and perception. 
However, these stored event models are the building blocks with which we construct action 
representations at the level of imaginative simulation. We first incorporate the actor‘s 
perceptions and the motor acts we are seeing into our action production systems to calculate 
a goal. Then we build event models by simulatively reasoning out how to most efficiently 
reach the goal, given the constraints as seen from the actor‘s perspective. This involves 
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joining together our lower-level event models specifying motor act sequences to see whether 
the cumulative action effects from the joined motor act sequences will bring about the goal. 
This entails a larger, consciously constructed action representation that we use to predict the 
actor‘s ongoing actions. This simulative reasoning event model also tells us why the actor is 
executing the actions that he is: because these actions constitute a means to the goal. They 
are the actions we would take if we wanted to bring about the goal. In this way the actor‘s 
overarching intentions, perceptions, goals and means are incorporated into our action 
representations. 
 
Section Summary: Simulative Reasoning to Figure Out Overarching Intentions 
Representing overarching intentions motivating a sequence of actions requires 
representing the goal (desired state) an actor is trying to attain, the actor‘s perceptions 
relating to goal achievement, and how the actions together can causally bring about the goal. 
When considering proximate goals, such as grasping a particular object as the goal of a 
reach, the goal is incorporated into our representation of the motor act itself (through 
sensorimotor associations). But goals in the distance require a reasoning process to infer 
them. Simulative reasoning, which corresponds to engaging in actions in one‘s imagination, 
can account for our capacity to infer goals and means to causally bring about the goals even 
in the case of novel actions, as realized by our capacity for imitative learning. 
To situate these ideas within the representational redescription framework 
(Karmiloff-Smith, 1992), recall that at the level below imaginative simulation, we have 
sensorimotor simulation processes for perceptual prediction. Imaginative simulation requires 
as a prerequisite extensive action analysis skills at this lower level. This is because running 
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imaginative simulations requires imaginatively engaging in actions and imagining the effects, 
which is impossible without sensorimotor simulation processes to tell you what the effects 
are going to be. Simulative reasoning about actions, in turn, entails a redescription of the 
motor act associations at the sensorimotor levels. We combine motor act sequences to see 
how they causally bring about a goal.  
 In all, we engage in conscious reasoning about the sensorimotor associations we had 
previously built unconsciously. In the process we construct a meaningful interpretation of the 
actions we are seeing. Therefore simulative reasoning occurs at a higher level of abstractness 
than sensorimotor simulation. At the same time, this level does not entail in and of itself that 
we are consciously theorizing about perceptions, intentions, and other mental states in the 
actor. Instead we are running through, in our imagination, mental processes like those 
experienced by the actor, which allows us to explain and predict his actions but without 
requiring that we consciously use abstract concepts and inferential rules about mental states.  
One framework that generally applies to action production, action perception, motor 
imagery can potentially be applied to see how higher level imaginative simulation can be 
build from lower level mechanisms. This proposal relies on the notion of emulation, which 
can be viewed as a more fleshed-out version of the concept of simulation. That is, it 
subsumes the idea of motor simulation, integrating it into a framework which includes 
simulating sensory consequences of motor acts and modeling the external environment. A 
basic function of these emulators is to guide our ongoing actions. As one is executing an 
action, an emulator predicts proprioceptive and kinesthetic feedback for estimating the state 
of the body. This prediction is integrated with and corrected by the actual incoming sensory 
feedback signal. The sensory feedback signal is subject to measurement error from sensory 
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noise. The predictions generated by the emulator, in turn, will be off to the extent that the 
emulator is an insufficient model in the context of the given action. The idea is that the 
system attempts to generate an optimal estimate of the current body state by weighing how 
far off the emulator‘s initial prediction versus the sensory feedback measurements is likely to 
be to decide how much to correct the emulator‘s prediction by. The claim most relevant for 
the current purpose is that emulators can also be driven separate from executed motor 
commands and direct perceptual input, and run on the basis of consciously imagined input. 
Such a capacity would constitute a specific means of linking higher-level, imaginative 
simulation procedures to the lower-level sensorimotor simulation processes that they are 
constructed from. At the same time, such a detailed sketch of these procedures also highlights 
the necessary pre-requisite component of feeding the correct input to drive imaginative 
simulation in the correct way. For example, in order for one to engage in correct simulative 
reasoning when observing why an actor who is making coffee is using a stool to reach a 
cabinet that does not have filters in it, one must calculate her false belief of their location and 
feed this knowledge state as the representation of reality for the emulator to run its simulation 
procedures on the basis of. This cannot always be calculated from other imaginative 
simulations, as the observer may not have all the detailed information to make the correct 
inferences of what the actor knows on that basis. Therefore, as implied by the anchoring and 
adjustment account (Epley et al., 2004; Saxe 2005), we must also have some means 
independent of simulation to calculate an actor‘s mental states, in order for simulative 
reasoning to work in all cases. 
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Theory Level Reasoning to Guide Action Perception, Explanation, and Prediction 
At the most abstract level of explaining and predicting actions we consciously take 
into account an agent‘s mental states and reason out the desires, beliefs, and intentions 
underlying his or her actions. We consider the actor as a rational agent who engages in 
actions on the basis of beliefs to fulfill desires. Our strategy, then, is to calculate the agent‘s 
likely beliefs and desires in a given situation to explain and predict his intentional actions 
(Dennett, 1997). At this level one explicitly separates the actor‘s beliefs from one‘s own 
knowledge of the world, understanding that the agent may act on the basis of a false 
representation of the world. Because the observer explains and predicts an agent‘s actions in 
terms of mental states which are not directly seen, but which serve as causal explanations for 
the actions that one does see, observers are proposed to reason in terms of a theory of mind. 
Like a scientific theory, one‘s theory of mind postulates abstract entities (mental states) to 
explain, interpret, and predict raw data (observed actions) (Gopnik & Wellman, 1992; 
Wellman, 1990). Also like a scientific theory, one‘s theory of mind is capable of going quite 
beyond the data it was originally formulated on and predict one‘s actions in novel scenarios 
(Gopnik & Wellman, 1992). With these ideas in mind, the proposal I will put forward is that 
a conscious theory of mind both expands our capacity for imaginative simulation, for better 
predictions and explanations for complex actions, and on the other hand is too abstract and 
―cold‖ to be of much use alone. That is, it allows us to ―detach‖ our reasoning about actions 
from the need to run an imaginative simulation, to facilitate our inferences and predictions 
when running a simulation would prove difficult. Yet it would not be of much use without 
our capacity to tie it back down to imaginative simulation procedures. 
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A Sketch of the Adult’s Causal-Explanatory Theory 
Our theory of mind is thought to undergo changes and expansions throughout 
development as children incorporate better understandings of mental states. Before 
considering these changes however, it makes sense to detail what is considered to be the full-
fledged theory of mind in adults, and outline its function in action analysis and its relation to 
simulation procedures. 
Causally Interrelated Terms 
Our fully developed theory of mind takes into account an actor‘s perceptions, beliefs 
about the world, desires, and intentions, and causally relates these mental states to each other 
and to the actor‘s actions. One model of the adult theory of mind postulates that we conceive 
of an actor‘s beliefs to be continuously updated by his perceptions (e.g., what he sees in the 
world). These percepts change, in turn, as a result of his actions, which stem from the 
intentions he formulates. These intentions are thought out, in turn, to fulfill desires, given the 
actor‘s beliefs (Wellman, 1990). We see that then that the adult theory of mind establishes a 
web of connections between the different mental states. The mental state terms are not 
isolated, but are defined in relation to one another. By reasoning in terms of this theory, and 
how a change in one state causally relates to changes in other mental states as well as actions, 
we can reason out how an actor‘s mental states would change when, for instance, his 
intended action fails, and on this basis further predict intended actions (Gopnik & Wellman, 
1992; Moore & Frye, 1991; Wellman, 1990).  
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Social Action Perception Deficits with Intact Theory-level Reasoning 
 One indication however that theory-level reasoning is not the full story explaining our 
understanding of others‘ actions comes from deficits in action perception and understanding 
that apparently aren‘t explained by deficits in theory-level concepts. First there is the case of 
high-functioning autism. There is a large body of evidence that such individuals have 
deficient functioning of their mirror system and fail to exhibit the same kind of automatic 
simulation of motor acts and emotions that is normally observed. This has led to hypothesis 
implicating such simulation impairment as the chief source of some of the main symptoms of 
autism (e.g., Oberman  & Ramachandran, 2007). In some cases it appears that those with 
autism may have the domain-general inferential reasoning skills needed to solve problems 
with the same level of representational complexity as reasoning in terms of an actor‘s false 
belief, but fail specifically on false belief problems (Charman & Baron-Cohen, 1995). In 
terms of the LOE framework, it appears that these situations involve impaired sensorimotor 
simulation processing, which in turn impairs the capacity of imaginative simulation as well. 
Thus, even though the capacity for theory level reasoning is not affected in such cases, the 
lack of the capacity to relate such reasoning to simulation procedures impedes social 
cognition and action analysis. 
 Another case where sensorimotor and imaginative simulation appears to be impaired, 
leading to action understanding deficits even though the theory-level concepts are functional, 
may be seen in cases brain lesions leading to apraxia. Such patients typically have problems 
that include deficits in executing appropriate actions with objects, and likewise appear 
impaired in proficiently recognizing others‘ actions (e.g., Pazzaglia, Pizzamiglio, Pez, & 
Agliotti, 2008). Likewise they may have deficits pantomiming and imagining object 
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appropriate actions; however, despite this at least in certain case studies they can correctly 
identify what the appropriate function of different objects should be (e.g., Ochipa, et al., 
1997). In terms of the LOE framework, deficiencies in the pragmatic programming of actions 
will entail failures in simulative reasoning, since this involves the same resources used to 
plan and execute one‘s own actions, even though the theory-level concepts (i.e., declarative 
knowledge) about objects and actions is preserved. Thus this is another case demonstrating 
the limitations of theory-level reasoning in complete isolation, without the capacity to relate 
such inferences back down to simulative reasoning. 
  
Section Summary: How Theory-Level Representations are Built and Used 
  Theory-level reasoning involves using an explanatory framework with causally 
connected mental constructs to make action inferences without simulating actions. Event 
models at the level of simulative reasoning are redescribed into sparser representations which 
simply label an actor‘s beliefs, desires, intentions, and perceptions. One can infer and track 
these at the theory level in cases of complex actions where these are continually in flux, and 
one‘s capacity for imaginative simulation by itself would be taxed. One need not keep in 
mind (imaginatively simulate) every detail related to how an actors‘ mental states are caused. 
That is, theory-level reasoning allows one to more explicitly represent how different 
scenarios at the level of simulative reasoning are linked. For instance, situations where an 
actor is absent, has his eyes closed, head turned around, a blindfold on, etc. during an a 
change in the environment from what he previously saw are all linked together, specified at 
the theory-level by an event model which represents the actor as believing (falsely) that the 
environment is as he saw it last.  
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In terms my LOE framework, theory-based action representations allow for more 
flexible reasoning than representations at the level of simulative reasoning because they need 
not carry with them detailed simulations of the actor‘s mental states, or the situations in 
which they rose, which can become cumbersome as actions become more complex. That is, 
at the theory level one can reason out actions and mental states by making use of general 
laws in a sort of deductive logic fashion, without simulatively re-creating all of the actor‘s 
subjective mental experiences when this is unnecessary, which could otherwise interfere with 
one‘s reasoning. However theory-level reasoning in the absence of the capacity to relate it to 
simulative reasoning leads to impairments in action analysis. 
Figure 1 sketches the basic Levels of Explicitness framework, and the roles of and 
relations between theory-level reasoning, simulative reasoning, and automatic sensorimotor 
simulation in action analysis. A chief aspect of this framework is that although theory-based 
and simulation-based inferences occur as distinct processes, in typical action analysis 
scenarios they complement one another and the inferences made through one route can be 
translated and fed into the other mode of reasoning. Event models for simulative reasoning 
incorporate far more detail about the experiential aspects of actions than theory-based 
reasoning deals with, which may be necessary for fluid processing or may be an unnecessary 
burden depending on the scenario. Finally, of note is the role of inhibitory processing for two 
separate functions in this framework: to provide, as a domain-general reasoning mechanism, 
for the logical rule-based reasoning that occurs at the theory-level, and separately to block 
one‘s own knowledge when simulating actions on the basis of the actor‘s differing 
knowledge states. 
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Figure 1.  A schematic depiction of the functioning and interactions of three levels of action 
analysis, according to my model. For concreteness, the figure displays a simulative reasoning 
event model built from two sensorimotor event models, though the general framework allows 
for simulative reasoning event models to be built from any number of sensorimotor event 
models (within the limits of cognitive capacity). Likewise, the figure displays each 
sensorimotor event model consisting of three motor acts, for concreteness. Solid thin arrows 
indicate sensorimotor associations. They indicate the associations between the motor acts 
within each sensorimotor event model. Motor acts are also associated with their sensory (e.g., 
proprioceptive, kinesthetic, and visual) effects. The arrows displaying these links are 
doubleheaded, as not only do motor acts activate their associated sensory effects, but vice-
versa (as suggested by the Blakemore (2001) model, and the common-coding principle). The 
thick arrow indicates the joining together (via imaginative simulation) of the sensorimotor 
event models, to represent an action for a non-immediate, ultimate goal. Motor act sequences 
constitute means for goals. Since achieving a subgoal is a means for achieving the ultimate 
goal, any means for a subgoal is also a means for the ultimate goal. The final set of sensory 
effects for each motor act sequence is marked with bracket, indicating that a subset of these 
effects specifies a goal of the motor act sequence. The action means, subgoals, and ultimate 
goal together constitute the overarching intention that is identified in the simulative reasoning 
level event model. At this level, individual motor act sequences (sensorimotor event models), 
and their associated subgoals, are represented as directed toward fulfilling the overarching 
intention. Finally, the elements of an action can be given a sparser, theory-level description. 
At this level, one consciously denotes the actor‘s mental states and reasons in terms of 
abstract rules to infer actions, world states, and future mental states. While simulative 
reasoning event models are comprised of sensorimotor event models, theory reasoning event 
models are not comprised of simulative reasoning event models. However, simulative 
reasoning event models can be ―translated‖ into (condensed) theory level descriptions, and 
theory level descriptions can be ―fleshed out‖ into detailed imaginative simulation scenarios. 
One chief kind of interaction between the theory and simulative reasoning levels is 
highlighted in the figure. One arrow points from the simulative reasoning event model to the 
actor‘s knowledge states, indicating that simulative reasoning is one route through which 
these states can be calculated. They can also be calculated at the theory level and then fed 
into the simulative reasoning event models, as indicated by other arrows. This highlights the 
idea that theory-level reasoning may in some cases be used to ―fill in‖ information for 
optimal simulative reasoning (and vice-versa). For instance, if one has been told that an actor 
has not witnessed a particular event, one may reason at the theory level to calculate the 
actor‘s false belief. Now one may engage in imaginative simulative reasoning to figure out 
the actor‘s specific intentions and actions, given the false belief one calculated at the theory 
level. In general, some situations may call for one to reason at the theory-level, to make 
inferences ―detached‖ from imaginative simulation, and then use these inferences at the 
simulative reasoning level. However to feed an actor‘s differing knowledge states into 
simulative reasoning event models requires first inhibiting one‘s own knowledge states. 
Inhibition plays a separate but related role in allowing for the deliberate, inferential reasoning 
that characterizes theory level calculations. 
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Summary of the Levels of Explicitness Framework 
According to the LOE framework, we process and understand actions at separate 
levels of abstractness and explicitness. Our ground level perception of another‘s actions 
makes fundamental use of our own sensorimotor brain systems for rapid perceptual 
interpretation and prediction. We learn associated chains of motor behavior, and use these 
regularities stored in the sensorimotor system to predict an actor‘s movements. At the next 
level, these associated behavior chains are representationally redescribed in terms of the 
overarching intentions of the action sequences. This is achieved by simulative reasoning to 
figure out the actor‘s goals and interpret the actions in this light. Sensorimotor-level event 
models are combined in one‘s imagination to plan actions to reach distant goals at the level 
of simulative reasoning.  At the theory level, the simulated intentions and other mental states 
and their logical and causal relations are explicitly labeled, allowing for conscious, theory-
based inferences and interpretations of the actions. Each higher level therefore becomes less 
tied to the specific perceptual input, and specifies a deeper, more meaningful understanding 
of an agent‘s action. 
While the LOE framework addresses a number of limitations of narrower models 
relating to how action perception and understanding is accomplished, there are a number of 
core questions that it raises. One issue left unspecified is just how intelligent the automatic 
system of sensorimotor simulation for predicting near-future motor acts is. For example, in 
predicting motor acts from gaze does it function in a simple fashion of simulating a reach to 
the nearest object in the actor‘s line of sight? Or is the actor‘s motor intention represented at 
a somewhat higher level, as for specific objects being gazed at and on the basis of calculating 
what the actor can see? Thus, the first set of experiments investigates our capacity to predict 
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basic motor acts from observing others‘ gazes towards objects. Their focus therefore is on 
specifying details on how sensorimotor simulation accomplishes this feat. Another core issue 
relates to the cost of making use of higher-level action analysis processes. That is, the 
question is to what extent does building more abstract representations to more richly 
represent others‘ actions occupy reasoning resources and impede other kinds of deeper 
reasoning one might otherwise engage in. Therefore, the second set of experiments focuses 
on higher-level representations of an action and a social agent‘s knowledge about the action. 
It explores what happens to one‘s own representation of an action when one demonstrates it 
for a social agent. Taken together, these studies detail processes supporting implicit, 
automatic as well as conscious, deliberate perceptual and conceptual representations of the 
actions and knowledge states of social agents.  
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CHAPTER II 
 
ACTION SIMULATION FROM GAZE OBSERVATION 
 
The starting point of coherent perceptual processing of an action sequence is forming 
representations of the motor acts being perceived, which drive perceptual prediction of motor 
acts to follow (cf. Wilson & Knoblich, 2005; Zacks et al., 2007). Thus, the ground level 
processes supporting action analysis must have some way to represent perceived motor acts, 
and to predict motor acts to immediately follow. In terms of the LOE framework, the 
observer‘s own sensorimotor system uses established associations between previously 
learned motor acts in automatic fashion when perceptually processing an ongoing action 
sequence. Therefore, representations of motor acts that typically go together in actions one 
has learned how to execute form the basis of perceptually processing others‘ actions. Almost 
any kind of action one typically engages in involves visual guidance. As such, eye 
movements typically precede hand movements toward goals (e.g., Land, Mennie, & Rusted, 
1999). Therefore, perceiving another‘s gaze should automatically activate the sensorimotor 
system for predicting the motor act likely to follow. The following set of experiments zero in 
on such fine grains of action where the goals are reaches to objects.  
A number of studies investigating the role of motor simulation in the perception of 
such simple motor acts have examined how observing another‘s reach can alter the 
kinematics of the observer‘s subsequent reach. In one experiment participants watched a 
human model on every trial reach for and grasp a big or small object and then reach for either 
the same object they saw the model reach for, or the other, different-sized object. 
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Participants‘ reaches were faster when they reached for the same object than when they 
reached for the different-sized object they saw the model reach for (Edwards, Humphreys, & 
Castiello, 2003). Another experiment also involved participants taking turns with a human 
model to reach for and grasp an object (Castiello, 2003). Sometimes the model reached for 
the object with a smaller distractor object in the vicinity. Reaching for an object when a 
smaller distractor object is present shifts a person‘s reach kinematics somewhat towards what 
the kinematics would be if the reach were for the distractor (e.g., slower velocity). When 
participants made their reach after seeing the model reach for the object in the vicinity of a 
smaller distractor, subjects‘ reach kinematics were similarly altered, even though subjects 
always reached without any distractor present. Most relevant for the current purposes, merely 
observing the human model gaze at the object and distractor display, but execute no reach, 
altered subjects‘ reach kinematics. These findings suggest that simply observing a person‘s 
reach, or potential reach as indicated by a gaze, entails a motor simulation of a reach with 
similar kinematics. In terms of the LOE framework, automatic sensorimotor simulation 
appears to be involved in the perception of basic motor acts such as reaches, and also in 
predicting such potential actions from gazes. 
The following experiments test how explicitly the goal of a potential reach indicated 
by a gaze is represented. In the LOE framework, sensorimotor simulation processes don‘t 
explicitly represent an actor‘s knowledge state. Rather, this occurs as a more deliberate 
process at the imaginative simulation and theory levels. The question is whether observers 
typically form event models of future actions indicated by gazes at such explicit levels, even 
for simple actions, or are only likely to do so when prompted by specific complicating 
factors. Therefore these experiments test in different ways the nature of the simulation 
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system supporting perceptual predictions. Their objective is to ascertain at which point 
simulative reasoning processes may come in on top of sensorimotor simulation to interpret 
others‘ gazes.  
 
Experiment 1 
A starting question about how our simulation processes work to interpret gaze is the 
specificity with which the goal as indicated by gaze is represented. One possibility is that in 
observing an actor‘s gaze, the observer‘s motor simulation is modulated by the actor‘s 
intention for the specific object gazed at by the actor. It is also possible that the observer runs 
a general motor simulation, without any reasoning about the actor‘s intention for the specific, 
gazed-at object. This general motor simulation would facilitate the observer‘s subsequent 
reach for any object which would be reached for similarly to the object gazed at by the actor, 
whether it is the exact same object or a different object with the same size and shape. 
Therefore, the following experiment has two conditions, the same-color and different-color 
conditions. The same-color condition is a replication of the procedure of Edwards, 
Humphreys, & Castiello, (2003). Here, the subject observes on every trial the actor gaze at or 
reach for a big or a small object. Then the subject reaches for the same-size (on valid trials) 
or different-sized (on invalid trials) object he saw the model presented with. The subject and 
model are always presented with objects of a given color, and that color is the same for both. 
The expectation here is to find, as in the original study, relatively facilitated reaches on valid 
trials, whether the subject sees the model reach or merely gaze. To determine whether 
intention-specific simulative reasoning occurs or whether a general motor simulation is 
automatically run, we turn to the different-color condition. Here, participants also reach for 
 40 
different and same-sized objects as those the model reaches for or gazes at. But in this 
condition the subject always reaches for a different object than the model, and this is always 
clear since the color of the objects the subject reaches for is always different from that of the 
model. If the effect is not present in the different-color condition gaze trials, this would 
suggest that the motor simulation run during gaze observation incorporates the reach from 
the actor‘s perspective, to the specific object the actor gazes at, rather than being only an 
automatic calculation of reach kinematic parameters for any object of that size and shape. 
Method 
Participants 
Participants were 10 adults who volunteered through a Vanderbilt University website 
(Mean age = 20.7 years, SD = 2.5 years, range = 19 to 27 years, 8 females). They participated 
either for class credit or $10 compensation. 
Materials 
Participants‘ hand motion was tracked using a pciBIRD DC Magnetic tracker with 
mid-range transmitter by Ascension Technology Corporation. The handtracker‘s sensor was 
attached to a wristband, which was worn on the participant‘s right hand. The model also 
wore a wristband with a handtracker sensor. This system was set up to record the 3D (xyz) 
coordinate positions the participant‘s and the model‘s hand at a rate of approximately 100 
measurements per second. 
A small square piece of tape was used to mark the starting position of the 
participant‘s hand, where the participant rested his or her hand when not reaching. The piece 
of tape was placed 5cm in front of the edge of the table. A piece of tape marking the model‘s 
starting position was likewise placed 5cm from the edge across. At the middle of the table, 44 
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cm from either edge of the table, was a piece of tape marking where the experimenter should 
place objects for the participant and model to reach for. 
A red cube, edge length 6.4 cm, was used as the ―big object‖ participants reached for. 
A smaller red cube, edge length 2.3 cm, was used as the ―small object.‖ There were also blue 
versions of the big and small objects for the different-color condition. All the cube objects 
were assembled with Lego pieces. In the same-color condition, the model reached for the 
same-colored cubes (red) as the participant. In the different-color condition, the model 
always reached for blue cubes and the participant always reached for red cubes. 
To randomize the trials and give instructions throughout the experiment to the 
participant and model, Matlab 9 for the Macintosh was used. 
Design 
 The design was within-subjects, with color-condition (same or different) blocked, and 
with the trial types randomized within each color-condition. On gaze-trials the model only 
gazed at whatever object he or she was presented with (big or small). On reach trials the 
model also reached for the object. On every trial the model was presented with a big or small 
object, and the participant reached for either the same-sized or different-sized object. For 
example, on a gaze-big-small (GBS) trial the participant would see the model gaze at a big 
object, and the participant would reach for a small object. A reach-big-small (RBS) trial 
would be the same except the participant would see the model reach for, not just gaze at, the 
big object. Thus there were eight trial-types (GBB, GSS, RBB, RSS, GSB, GBS, RSB, RBS). 
On valid trials the participant reached for the same-sized object he or she saw the model 
reach for or gaze at. On invalid trials, the participant reached for a different-sized object. 
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Eight trials from each trial type were randomized to generate 64 trials for each color-
condition. 
Procedure 
 The participant sat directly across the table from the model. The experimenter helped 
the participant put on the hand sensor wristband while the model put on her own. The 
participant was given basic instructions for the experiment. Four practice trials were run to 
get the participant used to the setup before the main experiment started. 
 On every trial, when not reaching, the participant had his index finger and thumb 
closed together and resting in the starting position square. He listened to cues from the 
computer throughout every trial. First the computer would say, ―Close your eyes.‖ The 
experimenter then placed either a big or small object in position. After 3 s the computer said, 
―Watch.‖ Then the participant would open his eyes and watch the model. The model gazed 
at, or reached for, either the big or small object. After 3 s, the computer said, ―Close your 
eyes.‖ again. At this point, with the participant‘s eyes closed, the experimenter either 
switched the object with a different-sized object or with a duplicate same-sized object. After 
4.5 s, the computer said, ―Reach.‖ At this point, the participant opened his eyes and reached 
for whatever object was in front of him, either the same-sized (on valid trials) or different-
sized (on invalid trials) object he saw the model presented with. He held the grasp until, after 
3 s from the point it said, ―Reach,‖ the computer said, ―Close your eyes.‖ This cued the 
participant to first move his hand back to the starting position and then close his eyes to start 
the next trial. 64 trials were run in this way, first in either the same-color or different-color 
condition, then in the other condition. 
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Data Analysis 
Based on the variables calculated by Edwards, Humphreys & Castiello (2003) to 
measure subjects‘ reach facilitation on valid vs. invalid trials, here participants‘ reach 
durations and reach deceleration times were calculated. This analysis was conducted using 
Matlab. A lowpass Butterworth filter was first applied to subjects‘ handtracker data. For each 
trial, the start of the reach was defined as the hand moving at a velocity of 5 cm/s or greater. 
The end of the reach was defined as the hand velocity falling back below 5 cm/s. Thus the 
reach duration was calculated as the amount of time the hand was in motion for a reach, with 
the start and stop of the reach defined in this way. The reach deceleration time was defined as 
the amount of time from the peak reach velocity to the end of the reach. Both lower reach 
durations and lower reach deceleration times indicate relative reach facilitation. Thus, if 
subjects are simulating reaches to objects they see the model gaze at or reach for, the 
expectation is to find lower durations and deceleration times on valid trials (when the subject 
sees the model gaze at or reach for an object of a given size and then reaches for the same-
sized object) than on invalid trials.  
Results 
Same-Color Condition Validity Effects 
Reach trials. In the same-color condition, on reach trials, participants‘ reach durations 
on valid trials and invalid trials did not differ, t (9) < 1, n.s. The same was true for 
deceleration-time. Figure 2 shows, for the same-color condition, the mean valid trial 
facilitation effect, defined as the invalid minus valid trial difference on a variable. This 
validity effect is shown for each variable (duration and deceleration-time) and for gaze trials 
and reach trials. 
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Gaze trials. In the same-color condition, on gaze trials, participants‘ reach durations 
on valid trials and invalid trials did not differ, t (9) < 1, n.s. The same was true for 
deceleration-time. See Figure 2. 
Different-Color Condition Validity Effects 
Reach trials. In the different-color condition, on reach trials, participants‘ reach 
durations on valid trials and invalid trials did not differ, t (9) < 1, n.s. The same was true for 
deceleration-time. See Figure 3. 
Gaze trials. In the different-color condition, on gaze trials, there was a marginal 
invalid minus valid trial difference in participants‘ reach durations on gaze trials, t (9) = 1.99, 
p = .08. Furthermore, the validity effect for deceleration time on gaze trials in the different-
color condition was statistically significant, t (9) = 3.04, p < .05. See Figure 3. 
Same-Color vs. Different-Color Condition Comparisons 
Participants‘ durations on the valid reach-trials in the same-color and different-color 
conditions were compared. The same comparisons were made for the valid gaze-trials, the 
invalid reach-trials, and the invalid gaze-trials. No differences in durations in these trial types 
were found, ts (9) < 1, n.s. The same held true for analogous comparisons for the deceleration 
times. Furthermore, there was no interaction between color-condition and validity on either 
variable for both gaze trials and reach trials, Fs(1, 9) < 1.45, n.s. These analyses suggest that 
color-condition had no impact on participants‘ reaches. 
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Figure 2.  Mean invalid minus valid trial reach duration and reach deceleration time 
differences (i.e., the valid-trial facilitation effects) for the subjects‘ reaches in Experiment 1, 
same-color condition. The horizontal axis labels each bar by the trial type (i.e., reach trials 
where the model reaches, or gaze trials where the model only gazes) plus the variable 
(duration or deceleration time) that the valid-trial facilitation effect is measured on. 
 
 
 
Figure 3.  Mean invalid minus valid trial reach duration and reach deceleration time 
differences for the subjects‘ reaches in Experiment 1, different-color condition. Bars marked 
with an asterisk represent statistically significant validity effects with p < .05, for this and 
subsequent figures. 
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Valid vs. Invalid Trial Comparisons Collapsed Across Color-Conditions 
Because both duration and deceleration time did not differ across color conditions, 
and there was no interaction between color-condition and validity, to check for overall 
validity effects the following analyses collapse the measures across color-conditions. Below, 
separately for gaze and reach trials, invalid minus valid differences in duration and in 
deceleration time are examined. 
Reach trials. On reach trials, participants‘ reach durations on valid trials from invalid 
trials did not differ, t (9) < 1, n.s. The same was true for deceleration-time. Thus, overall, 
participants were no faster in their reaches, and did not have lower deceleration times, on 
valid trials than on invalid trials. Figure 4 shows the valid-trial facilitation effects separately 
for reach and gaze trials. 
Gaze trials. On gaze trials, there was an overall marginal difference between invalid 
and valid trials for reach durations, indicating a possible faster duration on valid trials than on 
invalid trials, t (9) = 1.82, p=.10. Likewise, there was an overall marginal invalid minus valid 
trial difference on gaze trials for deceleration-time, t (9) = 2.18, p=.06. See Figure 4. 
Valid vs. Invalid Trial Comparisons On First Block 
Because participants may have become fatigued by the second block of trials from 
having to repeatedly close their eyes throughout the experiment, the following analysis 
checks if there were any valid-trial facilitation effect differences in the second block relative 
to the first block of trials. On the gaze-trials there was no reliable difference from one trial-
block to the other in this effect, either on duration or deceleration-time, ts (9) <1.45, n.s. 
However on reach-trials there was a trial-block difference in the valid-trial facilitation 
effects, both on duration, t (9) = 2.63, p<.05, and deceleration-time, t (9) = 2.42, p<.05.   
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Figure 4.  Mean invalid minus valid trial reach duration and reach deceleration time 
differences in Experiment 1, collapsed across conditions.  
 
Figure 5.  Mean invalid minus valid trial reach duration and reach deceleration time 
differences in Experiment 1, first trial block.  
 
 
This indicates that for reach-trials, the expected valid-trial facilitation effects were greater in 
the first block than the second block of trials. Because this kind of reach-trial validity effect 
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is reliably obtained in other research, the results of the first block of trials in this experiment 
may be more meaningful and it may make sense to focus on them. 
Reach trials. While in the overall analysis there was no reliable difference between 
invalid and valid reach-trials, on either duration or deceleration-time, for the first block of 
trials participants had lower durations on valid than invalid reach-trials, t (9) = 2.84, p<.05, 
and lower deceleration-times, t (9) = 2.57, p<.05. See Figure 5. 
Gaze trials. As in the overall analysis, on the first trial block there was an overall 
marginal difference between invalid and valid gaze-trials, suggesting a faster duration on 
valid trials than on invalid trials, t (9) = 1.80, p=.10. The analogous effect for deceleration 
time was statistically significant, t (9) = 2.38, p<.05. See Figure 5. 
Discussion 
These results suggest that color-condition had no effect on participant‘s reaches. The 
validity effects on participants‘ reaches from seeing the model‘s reaches or gazes did not 
decrease when participants reached for different-colored objects than the model. Rather, for 
the first block of trials regardless of color-condition, participants had lower reach durations 
and deceleration times when they saw the model first reach for or gaze at the same-sized 
object than a different-sized object. We can therefore conclude that this facilitation effect 
does not require the participant to reach for the same exact object as the model, but any 
object matched in size and shape. This suggests the effect is due to an automatic motor 
simulation of perceived reaches. 
 One possibility suggested by these results is that motor simulation during gaze 
observation is always inflexibly automatic and strict, using resources only at the 
sensorimotor simulation level (e.g., taking input only from something like the eye-direction-
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detection mechanism in Baron-Cohen, 1995). Another possibility, however, is that some 
situations lead to the actor‘s knowledge to be inferred and fed into the observer‘s motor 
simulation. In other words, seeing an actor gaze in the direction of an object may always 
automatically cue the simulation of a potential reach, or there may be situations where the 
observer‘s simulative reasoning about the actor‘s perceptual knowledge state shapes the 
simulation. 
 
Experiment 2 
The objective of this experiment was to investigate whether a representation of the 
model‘s perceptual knowledge state, i.e., what the model is seeing, is incorporated into the 
subject‘s simulation of her gaze. Therefore this experiment had two conditions, a transparent 
condition and an opaque condition. The transparent condition had the same basic setup as the 
same-color condition in Experiment 1, except on the model‘s line of sight toward the goal 
object there was a transparent barrier. Her hand path to the object was not obstructed by this 
barrier, and because it was transparent neither was her line of sight to the goal object. In the 
opaque condition, however, the model could not see the object she gazed in the direction of 
or reached for. Rather, an opaque barrier of the same size and shape as the barrier in the 
transparent condition obstructed her seeing of (but again, not her hand path to) the goal 
object. For the transparent condition, the expectation was to see the same pattern of results in 
as in the first trial block for Experiment 1, i.e., as if there were no barrier. Thus, the 
expectation in the transparent condition was to find relatively facilitated reaches by the 
participant to an object after observing the model reach for or gaze at the same-sized object. 
The question was whether this effect would also occur in the opaque condition.   
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Method 
Participants 
Participants were 20 adults who volunteered through a Vanderbilt University website 
for class credit or $10 (Mean age = 25.6 years, SD = 6.1 years, range = 19 to 45 years, 10 
females). 
Materials 
 The same materials as in Experiment 1 were used, with all red cube objects and with 
the following additions. For the transparent condition, a plastic rectangular lid object 25.8 cm 
in length x 3.4 cm in width by 20.33 cm in height, glued lengthwise to a foam-board base 
27.2 cm in length x 11.5 cm in width x 0.4 cm in height was used. From the participant‘s 
perspective, its outer left side was placed 7.8 cm to the right of the center of the cube object 
position. The model could gaze through its side to the cube object, and it did not impede the 
model‘s hand path to the object. For the opaque condition, a barrier of the same dimensions 
and in the same location was used, with white poster-board paper covering its side, 
preventing the model from being able to look through it to the object. There was also a flat 
square piece of orange paper, edge-length 7.5 cm., used as a location marker, that was placed 
on the barrier‘s base on the side the model could see, so that in the opaque condition the 
model could approximate where to reach to grab the unseen object by looking at the 
reflection produced by the barrier of the marker.  
Design 
Participants were randomly assigned to either the transparent or opaque condition. 
Within each condition eight trials of each trial type were randomized to generate 64 trials, as 
in Experiment 1.  
 51 
Procedure 
 It became apparent in Experiment 1 that two blocks of 64 trials, for a within-subjects 
design, may have tired participants out and compromised their reaches on the second block 
of trials. Therefore, in this experiment, participants received only one block of 64 trials, 
either for the transparent condition or the opaque condition. Participant and model sat 
diagonally across from each other. In the transparent condition participants were told that the 
model would be gazing not directly at the big or small cube, but through her left side of the 
transparent object to the cube. In the opaque condition they were told that the model would 
not see the big or small cube, either during her gazes or reaches. Rather, the plastic material 
of the occluder produced a reflection of the location marker that was on the occluder‘s base. 
When the model gazed she looked at the reflection of the marker, making her eye gaze 
direction matched to what it would be if she were looking at the cube, and giving her the 
location to reach her hand to without her seeing the cube. See Figure 6 for an illustration of 
the basic setup. The rest of the procedure was the same as in Experiment 1.  
 
Figure 6. Basic setup for Experiment 2, showing the subject‘s view of the model‘s reach for 
the large cube object in the transparent condition. The model looks in the direction of the 
cube object from her left side of the barrier object. Thus, when the barrier object is 
transparent she looks through it to the cube object. When the barrier object is opaque she 
looks at the reflection produced by the barrier object of the flat orange marker. This 
reflection directs her gaze direction toward the same spatial location that the cube object 
occupies, even though she does not see the actual cube object. On gaze trials she just holds 
her gaze; on reach trials she also reaches for the cube object. Then, later in the trial the 
subject reaches for either the same-sized object, or a different-sized object.  
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Results 
Transparent Condition 
Reach trials. For the transparent condition, participants‘ reach durations on valid 
reach trials was lower than their durations on invalid reach trials, t (9) = 2.33, p<.05. The 
same was true for deceleration time, t (9) = 2.53, p<.05. See Figure 7. 
Gaze trials. For the transparent condition, participants‘ reaches on valid gaze trials 
did not differ in duration from their reaches on invalid gaze trials, t (9) < 1, n.s. The same 
was true for deceleration time. See Figure 7. 
Opaque Condition 
Reach trials. For the opaque condition, participants‘ reaches on valid reach trials did 
not differ in duration from their reaches on invalid reach trials, t (9) = 1.13, n.s. The same 
was true for deceleration time, t (9) < 1, n.s. See Figure 8. 
Gaze trials. For the opaque condition, participants‘ reaches on valid gaze trials did 
not differ in duration from their reaches on invalid gaze trials, t (9) < 1, n.s. The same was 
true for deceleration time. See Figure 8. 
Discussion 
The two main predictions originally considered for this experiment involved the opaque 
condition. The original expectation was that the transparent condition results would look like 
those for the first block of trials for Experiment 1. That is, the expectation in the transparent 
condition was to see a relative priming effect on participants‘ reaches for both valid gaze and 
valid reach trials. If that were the case, we might interpret the lack of this pattern in the 
opaque condition as evidence that motor simulation is not always automatically generated by 
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perceiving another person gaze in the direction of an object, but by considering what the 
person is seeing.  
 
 
Figure 7.  Mean invalid minus valid trial reach duration and reach deceleration time 
differences for the subjects‘ reaches in Experiment 2, transparent condition. 
 
 
Figure 8.  Mean invalid minus valid trial reach duration and reach deceleration time 
differences for the subjects‘ reaches in Experiment 2, opaque condition. 
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However, there was no overall effect in the opaque condition, and only an effect for reach 
trials in the transparent condition. When participants saw the model look through a 
transparent object to a big or small cube, they had lower durations and deceleration-times in 
their own reaches to the same-sized cubes only when they saw the model also reach for the 
object. It may be the case that perceiving a gaze and no reach results automatically in a motor 
simulation of a reach to the first graspable object down the line of the model‘s sight. But 
when the model doesn‘t just gaze but also reaches for the object further down the line of 
sight from the obstructing object, the participant simulates a reach for the reached-for object, 
but only when the model‘s gaze could have been to that object (i.e., in the transparent 
condition).  
 
Experiment 3 
The results from Experiment 2 suggest a sensorimotor simulation system that is 
insensitive to the actor‘s visual access to objects in the context of ambiguous gaze input if 
that input is not disambiguated by a subsequent motor act. A natural interpretation of these 
findings may be that the model‘s gaze toward (or alternatively, through) the object-like 
barrier may, when the barrier is transparent, confound the observer‘s sensorimotor simulation 
system as to whether the reach to simulate should be to the barrier object itself or to the 
object further down the model‘s line of sight. If the barrier is changed to something less 
object-like (i.e., as something not likely to be grasped), a straightforward prediction would be 
that the sensorimotor simulation system, if it can process such a distinction, would calculate a 
gaze through the non-object-like barrier to a graspable object as a gaze to the latter, and 
therefore automatically simulate the proper reach even on trials where the model doesn‘t 
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reach for the object. On the other hand, if the sensorimotor simulation system can only deal 
with potentially graspable objects as input, such a situation may only further confound it. 
Method 
Participants 
Participants were 30 adults who volunteered through a Vanderbilt University website 
for class credit (Mean age = 21.4 years, SD = 2.8 years, range = 18 to 23 years, 24 females). 
Materials 
 The same materials as in Experiment 2 were used, with the following changes. For 
the transparent screen condition, a plexiglass flat rectangular screen with thin metallic wire 
looping through small holes in its top was used. The screen stood up due to the wire being 
looped at the upper end through attachment points at the ceiling, rather than a base on the 
table being used to support the screen. It was 60 cm in length by 60.5 cm in height (and of 
nominal width). This screen replaced the transparent rectangular object used in Experiment 2. 
It was placed 7.8 cm to the right (from the participant‘s perspective) of the center of the cube 
object. The model could gaze through its side to the cube object, and it did not impede hand 
path to the object. For the opaque condition, a screen barrier of the same dimensions and in 
the same location was used, with white poster-board paper covering one of its sides, 
preventing the model from being able to look through it to the object. There was a flat square 
piece of orange paper, used as a location marker, to the side of the screen that the model 
could see, so the model could approximate in the opaque screen condition where to reach in 
order to grab the unseen object (in the same manner as in Experiment 2). 
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Design 
 Participants were randomly assigned to either the transparent screen or opaque screen 
condition. Within each condition eight trials of each trial type were randomized to generate 
64 trials, as in Experiment 2.  
Procedure 
 In the transparent screen condition participants were told that the model would be 
gazing not directly at the big or small cube, but through the transparent screen to the cube. In 
the opaque screen condition they were told that the model would not see the big or small 
cube, either in their gazes or reaches. Rather, the plastic material of the screen produced a 
reflection of the location marker. When the model gazed she looked at the marker‘s 
reflection, making her eye gaze direction matched to what it would be if she were looking at 
the cube, and giving her the location to reach her hand to without her seeing the cube. See 
Figure 9 for an illustration of the basic setup. The rest of the procedure was the same as in 
Experiment 2.  
 
Figure 9. Basic setup for Experiment 3, showing the subject‘s view of the model‘s reach for 
the large cube object in the transparent screen condition. The screen served the same function 
as the barrier object in Experiment 2. 
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Results 
Transparent Screen Condition 
Reach trials. For the transparent screen condition, participants‘ reaches on valid reach 
trials did not differ in duration from their reaches on invalid reach trials, t (14) < 1, n.s. The 
same was true for deceleration time, t (14) = 1.06, n.s.  See Figure 10. 
Gaze trials. For the transparent screen condition, participants‘ reaches on valid gaze 
trials did not differ in duration from their reaches on invalid gaze trials, t (14) = 1.07, n.s. The 
same was true for deceleration time, t (14) < 1. See Figure 10. 
Opaque Screen Condition 
Reach trials. For the opaque screen condition, participants‘ reaches on valid reach 
trials did not differ in duration from their reaches on invalid reach trials, t (14) < 1, n.s. The 
same was true for deceleration time, t (14) < 1, n.s. See Figure 11. 
Gaze trials. For the opaque screen condition, participants‘ reaches on valid gaze trials 
did not differ in duration from their reaches on invalid gaze trials, t (14) < 1, n.s. The same 
was true for deceleration time, t (14) < 1, n.s. See Figure 11. 
Discussion 
 With a large flat screen rather than a more object-like barrier serving as the 
transparent or opaque obstruction along the model‘s line of sight to the cube object, subjects 
failed to exhibit relatively facilitated reaches on trials where the model first reached or gazed 
at the same-sized object. It did not matter if the screen was opaque or transparent. These 
findings appear to suggest that the sensorimotor simulation system fails to become activated 
in certain situations. To understand circumstances that may prevent this activation, it is 
important to attempt to reconcile these results with the Experiment 2 findings, which 
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demonstrate such simulation when an observer first sees an ambiguous gaze to one of two 
objects along an actor‘s line of sight, if it is followed by a disambiguating reach. 
 
 
Figure 10.  Mean invalid minus valid trial reach duration and reach deceleration time 
differences for the subjects‘ reaches in Experiment 3, transparent screen condition. 
 
 
 
Figure 11. Mean invalid minus valid trial reach duration and reach deceleration time 
differences for the subjects‘ reaches in Experiment 3, opaque screen condition. 
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 Observing another‘s gaze appears to automatically trigger an attention shift in the 
observer to the gaze target (Friesen & Kingstone, 1998; Friesen, Moore, & Kingstone, 2005). 
This may be interpreted as an automatic simulation in the observer of the actor‘s attention 
shift (e.g., Tipper, 2010). In fact, an observer‘s gaze shifts appear to be coordinated with the 
observer‘s motor simulation processes for predicting actions (Flanagan & Johansson, 2003). 
These considerations imply that a component of sensorimotor simulation, namely eye-
movement simulation (leading to actual eye-movement) is in most circumstances 
automatically activated when observing another‘s actions.  
 The current findings suggest that the motor simulation component of sensorimotor 
simulation is not always triggered by observing a gaze or even a gaze plus reach. When an 
object-like barrier is along the observed actor‘s line of sight to an object the actor reaches for, 
the observer appears to simulate the reach. However, the observer may fail to engage in any 
simulation, or alternatively to automatically simulate a reach to the first object in the actor‘s 
line of sight whenever there is no reach by the actor to disambiguate the gaze. Furthermore, 
even with such a reach the motor simulation aspect appears to be blocked in certain 
circumstances, such as in Experiment 3, when the barrier is large in area and less object-like 
in its dimensions. Perhaps the sensorimotor simulation system works best with unambiguous 
input, with some capacity to adapt when the input becomes disambiguated in a relatively 
straightforward fashion. In the case of a large screen, however, rather than disambiguating 
the input (as was presumed would happen), the sensorimotor simulation system may be 
unable to deal properly with non-object-like visual barriers to disambiguate potential motor 
actions. It may process only relatively graspable objects in the context of calculating 
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potential reaches, and fail to process actions involving gazes toward objects unlikely to be 
grasped. 
 This interpretation would suggest that although the sensorimotor simulation system is 
not automatically activated in all potential actions that one may observe, it is still an 
automatic system in the sense of being limited in the kinds of visual input it processes, 
triggered automatically by such input, and not subject to conscious control.  
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CHAPTER III 
 
SOCIAL HIGHLIGHTING LEADS TO LEARNING INTERFERENCE 
 
In the prior set of experiments the objective was to investigate how simulation-based 
processes function to drive the perception of simple action sequences involving gazing and 
reaching. In terms of the LOE framework, the focus was on the sensorimotor simulation 
level. While one motivating question was what pushes higher-level simulative reasoning to 
become incorporated into observers‘ action representations, the results did not clearly point 
to such higher-level simulation processes. Rather, they suggested limitations on the 
functioning of automatic sensorimotor simulation in action observation. In the set of 
experiments discussed for the current chapter, the focus is on the levels of action analysis 
above automatic sensorimotor simulation, i.e., simulative and theory-based reasoning. These 
experiments investigate participants‘ demonstrations of a complicated means-end action 
sequence (the Tower of Hanoi puzzle). By testing how forming a representation of the task 
for a social agent impacts one‘s own representation and capacity to transfer this 
understanding to a more difficult version of the problem, the objective is to learn about the 
resources recruited in social highlighting, and in building higher-level event models. 
 
Imitation Teaching: Possible Costs and Benefits to the Teacher 
 The set of experiments presented in this chapter in some respects set up a an 
imitation-learning situation, but the focus is on what the teacher learns (or alternatively, is 
impeded from learning) rather than what the one being taught learns. As discussed in the first 
chapter, imitation learning involves several components. The learner observes a novel means 
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(sequence of motor acts) toward a novel goal (desired state of the world). He engages in 
perspective taking, i.e., taking into account the teacher‘s knowledge and intentions in trying 
to understand the action sequence from this perspective (Tomasello, Kruger, & Rather, 
1993). In terms of the LOE framework, the learner engages in simulative reasoning to 
acquire the understanding of a novel means toward a novel goal. 
 Let us consider the teacher‘s role. In demonstrating a task in a way for another person 
to understand, both simulative and theory-level reasoning components may be involved. 
One‘s own representation of the solution of the task needs to be adjusted in order to 
incorporate the learner‘s lack of knowledge of what steps to take and why. This is needed in 
order to know what steps, and potential pitfalls, to highlight for the learner. The way this 
would work in the LOE framework is to first construct an event model representing the 
sequence of actions the learner would execute to attempt to solve the task if not taught 
otherwise. This can be accomplished via simulative reasoning, but one‘s own knowledge 
about the correct way to do the task would need to be inhibited in order validly simulate 
reasoning about the task from the learner‘s perspective (cf. Goldman, 2006). Because this 
sort of knowledge inhibition may require working memory resources (cf. Apperly, Riggs, 
Simpson, Chiavarino, & Samson, 2006; Lin, Keysar, & Epley, 2010), it may impede one‘s 
capacity to learn (i.e., form a deeper, more generalized representation of the problem) while 
demonstrating the task for a social agent. On top of such simulative reasoning, theory-level 
reasoning, i.e. logical reasoning rather than simulating the task from the learner‘s 
perspective, may also be used to infer specific steps that would need to be highlighted for a 
person lacking knowledge about the task. But in that case, resources that might otherwise be 
used to logically infer rules for a deeper understanding of the task may be partly occupied to 
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figure out how to best demonstrate the task. Therefore, there is an argument that aspects of 
both the simulative and theory-level reasoning a teacher might engage in to demonstrate the 
task to a social agent will interfere with the teacher‘s own learning. 
Yet other aspects of simulative reasoning may, on the other hand, offer a route for 
enhanced learning in the teacher. Adjusting one‘s task representation to construct an event 
model from the learner‘s perspective, and highlighting important steps during one‘s 
demonstration of the correct solution, may push one to think more about why certain steps 
achieve the goal and others lead one astray. This may facilitate one‘s learning of a deeper, 
more generalized set of rules and principles for solving the task. The most relevant prior 
research in support of this argument of comes from the learning-by-teaching literature. The 
concept of learning-by-teaching stemmed from the notion that figuring out how to teach 
another person how to solve a problem might enrich the teacher‘s own understanding and 
encoding of the solution. The idea is that reorganizing one‘s knowledge of a domain for the 
learner makes the teacher study the material in a new way and solidifies and generalizes this 
knowledge (Bargh & Schul, 1980). Enhanced benefits from learning-by-teaching have been 
shown in domains ranging from reading skills (e.g., Juel, 1996) to math and science concepts 
(e.g., Topping, Campbell, Douglas, & Smith, 2003; Topping, Peter, Stephen, & Whale, 
2004). Whereas in normal circumstances one may naturally solve problems in terms of one‘s 
own knowledge only, in learning-by-teaching situations, taking on the teacher‘s role can push 
one to solve problems in a domain of expertise differently from the automated way the expert 
is used to solving such problems. This may push one to build a deeper understanding of the 
task. Of note however, is that situations typically producing learning-by-teaching effects tend 
to involve relatively unconstrained interactions between the teacher and learner. On one 
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view, the bulk of the benefits from learning-by-teaching would not occur by merely 
demonstrating to a passive audience, but rather are a product either of extensive pre-teaching 
preparation (e.g., Bargh & Schul, 1980; Renkl 1995), or of subsequent interactions with the 
audience (e.g., Chi, 2009; Roscoe & Chi, 2007).  
The basic objective of the set of experiments discussed in this chapter is to test 
whether the simulative and theory-level reasoning generated to demonstrate a task to a 
passive social agent, in the absence of interactions which may push deeper thinking, will help 
or hurt one‘s learning. In addition to discovering insights about learning-by-teaching, the 
goal is to learn about the cognitive processes involved in constructing and using the higher-
level event models (i.e., at the levels above automatic sensorimotor simulation) that, 
following from the LOE framework, one needs to use in order to demonstrate and highlight 
effectively to a social agent.   
 
Experiment 1 
To test whether the initial cognitive responses and consequent demonstration 
behaviors induced by a social agent improve, or possibly interfere with, learning-by-teaching, 
this experiment had two conditions. This experiment employed a paradigm involving a 
passive agent similar to that in Herberg et al. (2008), in which participants demonstrated for a 
social agent, a human, or a non-social agent, a computer, how to solve the Tower of Hanoi 
problem. Each kind of agent was represented by a simple picture. In that study there was a 
substantially greater number of social highlighting behaviors evoked in demonstrations to the 
picture of the human. Therefore, participants‘ representation of the agent as social, even in 
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the absence of interaction, more strongly pushed them to consider which aspects of the 
solution need to be highlighted, given the agent‘s (lack of) knowledge about the task.  
The Tower of Hanoi task is a puzzle involving three poles and three or more rings of 
different sizes. The rings start on the leftmost pole and the goal is to get them to the 
rightmost pole by moving one ring at a time without placing a larger ring on top of a smaller 
one. In the current experiment, participants first learned to solve the 3-ring Tower of Hanoi 
problem. Then they demonstrated their solution to a computer or human agent. Finally, they 
solved the more difficult 4-ring Tower of Hanoi problem for themselves, in the absence of 
the agent. The idea was to measure how deeply they learned from their demonstration by 
examining how effectively they generalized to the 4-ring problem.  
Method 
Participants 
56 Vanderbilt undergraduates and members of the surrounding community 
participated for class credit or $10. Six were excluded from analysis for having prior 
experience solving Tower of Hanoi problems, 4 for violating task rules, and 2 for failing to 
solve the 4-ring task within six minutes. Therefore, the data for 44 participants (22 in each 
condition, alternately assigned) were analyzed (Mean age = 26.4 years, 25 females).  
Materials 
 For the human condition, participants saw a picture of a college-aged male. For the 
computer condition, a picture of a computer and monitor with a mounted camera was used. 
Participants were also shown a picture of a mechanical device capable of grasping objects 
when the computer audience was described, though this picture was not present when 
participants demonstrated their solution. 
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The materials participants used to solve the Tower of Hanoi tasks were three plastic 
tubes and three or four plastic rings (a small red ring, medium sized yellow ring, and large 
green ring for the 3-ring problem, plus a larger blue ring for the 4-ring problem). 
Participants‘ solutions and demonstrations were videotaped for later coding.  
Procedure 
Three plastic poles with three rings on the leftmost pole were placed on a table in 
front of the participant. Participants were told that the goal of the task was to get the three 
rings from the leftmost pole to the rightmost pole. They were told that they could move one 
ring at a time from one pole to any other pole, and that they could not move a larger ring on 
top of a smaller ring.  
After explaining the three-ring Tower of Hanoi task, the experimenter asked the 
participant to complete the task, then went behind a curtain to avoid influencing the 
participant‘s solutions and demonstrations. When the participant indicated he/she had 
finished the task, the experimenter re-entered the room and set up the materials for 
demonstrating it. A picture of the audience (human or computer) was placed on a stand to the 
participant‘s front and right, as well as the three rings and three poles in their original setup. 
The experimenter described the audience the participant was going to demonstrate to. The 
human audience was described as being ready to learn the Tower of Hanoi task by watching 
the participant. The computer audience was described as being able to take in action 
information through a camera and to carry out actions by moving a mechanical gripping 
device. In both cases participants were instructed to imagine the computer or human audience 
in the room while they demonstrated the task in whatever way they felt natural to allow the 
audience to be able to do the same action. Participants were told not to use language. After 
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describing the audience and explaining the demonstration task, the experimenter again left 
the participant‘s section of the room. After the participant indicated he or she had finished the 
demonstration of the 3-ring Tower of Hanoi problem, the experimenter set up the 4-ring 
Tower of Hanoi problem with the same three rings as before, plus one larger ring on the 
bottom. Participants were told that their task was to solve a more difficult version of the same 
problem, with the same rules, constraints, and goal, but with four instead of three rings. The 
audience was removed, and participants were told to simply solve the problem and not worry 
about the audience anymore. The experimenter then left the participant alone to solve the 
problem. If the participant failed to solve the problem in six minutes, the experimenter ended 
the session (excluding the participant‘s data from analysis). 
Coding 
 Videos of participants‘ solutions to the Tower of Hanoi problems were coded for 
solution time and the number of solution steps (movements of a ring from one pole to 
another). Both shorter solution times and fewer steps indicate a better understanding of how 
to solve the task (e.g., Goel & Grafman, 1994). If the participant restarted the task then the 
number of steps only in the final, complete solution was counted. For all experiments, all 
statistically significant findings remain when participants who restarted the 4-ring task are 
excluded from analysis. 
Additionally, in participants‘ demonstrations of the 3-ring solution, the number of 
looks at the picture of the audience, and the number of gestures highlighting objects and 
actions (usually points) were counted, to measure participants‘ social response behaviors. 
A preliminary check was made to ensure there were no mean differences in Tower of 
Hanoi problem solving abilities in participants in the computer vs. human conditions. 
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Participants in the computer vs. human conditions did not reliably differ in either variable in 
the 3-ring problem, before the computer or human audience was introduced, ts (42) < 1.63, 
n.s. 
Results 
Social Cue Differences in Demonstrations of the Three-Ring Problem 
 In a replication of Herberg et al. (2008), participants in the computer condition looked 
less frequently at the picture (M = 4.04, SD=3.17) than participants in the human condition 
(M = 9.00, SD=3.98), t (42) = 4.54, p <.01. They also pointed less frequently for the 
computer audience (M =1.86, SD=2.70 versus M = 5.27, SD=4.07), t (42) = 3.24, p <.01.  
Solution-Time and Number of Steps For the Four-Ring Problem 
Participants in the human condition required more steps to solve the problem than 
participants in the human condition, t (42) = 2.72, p <.05. There was also an interaction 
between task (four-ring vs. three-ring) and condition, F (1,42) = 4.52, p <.05. In addition, 
participants in the human condition solved the 4-ring Tower of Hanoi problem more slowly 
than participants in the computer condition, although this difference only approached 
significance, t (42) = 1.84, p =.07, with no interaction between task and condition, F (1, 42) = 
1.32, p =.26. Figures X and X display the results from all of the experiments in this chapter. 
See the Experiment 1 bars in Figure 12 for the solution time results, and Figure 13 for the 
number of steps results. 
Discussion 
After demonstrating their solution of the three-ring Tower of Hanoi problem to a 
computer or human audience, participants who demonstrated it to the computer audience 
tended to solve the four-ring problem more efficiently, in fewer steps, than those who 
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demonstrated to the human audience. This suggests that those who demonstrated to the 
computer audience were better able to transfer their knowledge about how to solve the 3-ring 
problem and generalize it to the four-ring problem. 
 
 
Figure 12. Mean 4-ring and 3-ring Tower of Hanoi solution times for participants in the 
Computer and Human conditions in Experiments 1 and 2 and the Repeat and Interruption 
conditions in Experiment 3. 
 
 
Figure 13. Mean 4-ring and 3-ring Tower of Hanoi number of steps for participants in the 
Computer and Human conditions in Experiments 1 and 2 and the Repeat and Interruption 
conditions in Experiment 3. 
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Rather than facilitating encoding and transfer of solution strategies, representing the agent as 
social, and engaging in the resulting social highlighting behaviors, may have interfered with 
participants‘ deep encoding of the Tower of Hanoi task. Taking the perspective of a less 
knowledgeable person, and adjusting one‘s own representation of the task to incorporate this 
lack of knowledge, appears to have impeded participants‘ capacity to deeply encode and 
learn from one‘s demonstration.  
Before further addressing the implications of this finding, it would be helpful to first 
have a more detailed understanding of which aspects of the problem subjects who 
demonstrate to a social agent are more likely to be impeded from learning. One basic 
question is whether participants in the human condition were less likely to develop any sort 
of abstract rule to adapt their knowledge of the 3-ring solution to the 4-ring task, relying 
instead on trial-and-error. This would suggest that their demonstrations led to a generally 
shallow encoding of the 3-ring solution (cf. Vollmeyer, Burns, & Holyoak, 1996). 
Alternatively, participants in the computer condition may have simply hit upon a simpler 
heuristic for succeeding. While the most explicitly rule-based strategy is to develop a 
recursive algorithm for solving a Tower of Hanoi problem of any number of rings, it is also 
possible to develop less precise strategies, such as a strategy to correctly isolate the largest 
ring on the first step (Simon, 1975). For the four-ring problem, the optimal first step is to 
move the top ring from the leftmost pole to the middle pole. In the three-ring problem, the 
optimal first step is to the rightmost pole. More participants in the computer condition 
(81.8%) made the optimal first step in the four-ring problem than participants in the human 
condition (63.8%), 2(1) = 1.83; p= .09. To test whether a suboptimal first step was 
 71 
responsible for relatively poor performance in the human condition, participants in the next 
experiment were told the first step for each Tower of Hanoi task. If they still show a 
decreased ability to solve the four-ring problem in the human condition, this would indicate 
that the social interference lessens participants' capacity to form a four-ring strategy in 
general.  
 
Experiment 2 
Method 
Participants 
Out of 59 Vanderbilt undergraduates who participated, 8 were excluded for having 
prior experience solving Tower of Hanoi problems, 7 for violating task rules, and 4 for 
failing to solve the 4-ring task within six minutes. This left 40 participants (20 in each 
condition) who completed the experiment in exchange for class credit (Mean age = 19.7 
years, 35 females).  
Procedure 
 The materials, design, and procedure were the same as for Experiment 1, with the 
following changes. After the three-ring Tower of Hanoi problem was described, the 
participant was told that in order to solve the problem in the minimum number of steps, the 
first move should be from the leftmost pole to the rightmost pole. Likewise, after the 4-ring 
problem was set up, the participant was told that the first move should be from the leftmost 
pole to the middle pole. They were told that they need not necessarily solve either problem in 
the minimum number of steps (since as in Experiment 1 the question was how the audience 
manipulation and demonstration behaviors, apart from an explicit minimum step requirement 
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in the problem setup, would impact the efficiency of their solutions), but that they should do 
the optimal first step as shown to them. 
A preliminary check on participants‘ solution time and number of steps for the three-
ring problem was again made. Participants in the computer and human conditions did not 
reliably differ, ts (38) < 1.05, n.s.  
Results 
Social Cue Differences in Demonstrations of the Three-Ring Problem 
 Participants in the computer condition exhibited less pointing behavior (M = 1.80 
SD=3.14) than participants in the human condition (M = 6.55, SD=5.97), t (38) = 3.08, 
p<.01). Participants in the computer condition (M=5.65, SD=4.56) also tended to 
demonstrate the 3-ring solution with fewer looks to the picture than participants in the human 
condition (M=8.65, SD=6.00), though this tendency only approached significance, t (38) = 
1.78, p =. 08.  
Solution-Time and Number of Steps For the Four-Ring Problem 
Participants took less time to solve the 4-ring problem in the computer condition than 
in the human condition, t (38) = 2.64, p < .05, with the task by condition interaction also 
significant, F (1,38) = 5.27, p < .05. Participants in the two conditions did not differ in the 
number of steps they took to solve the task t (38) =.93, p = .36. See Figures 12 and 13. 
Effects of Social Cues in 3-ring Demonstration on 4-ring Solution in Experiments 1 and 2  
Solution time. To assess the impact of social cue production (looks and points) in the 
3-ring demonstrations on participants‘ solutions of the 4-ring problem, a multiple regression 
analysis on the Experiment 1 and 2 data combined was conducted. A multiple regression 
analysis with 4-ring solution time as the dependent variable and with audience-condition, 3-
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ring solution time, 3-ring number of steps, demonstration solution time, demonstration 
number of steps, number of looks, and number of points as the independent variables 
produced an overall model with adjusted R
2
 = .30, F(7,76) = 6.01, p < .01. As shown in 
Table 1, the Experiments 1 and 2 data suggest that producing more points in their 3-ring 
demonstrations may have resulted in participants taking longer to solve the 4-ring task. This 
is the case even though more looks goes in the direction of predicting quicker 4-ring 
solutions. See Table 1. 
Number of steps. A multiple regression analysis with 4-ring number of steps as the 
dependent variable produced an overall model with adjusted R
2
 = .15, F(7,76) = 3.06, p < 
.01. As Table 2 shows, producing more points in their 3-ring demonstrations is tied to 
participants developing less optimal strategies for solving the 4-ring task (while more looks 
predicts more optimal 4-ring solutions). See Table 2. 
Discussion 
 Experiment 2 replicates Experiment 1 by demonstrating that even when participants 
were given the first step for an optimal solution to the Tower of Hanoi problem, they took a 
longer time to solve the 4-ring task after demonstrating the 3-ring task for a human. Rather 
than facilitating their transferable learning, demonstrating the 3-ring problem for a social 
versus non-social agent again appears to have impeded it. Here this is seen in participants‘ 
longer solution times for the 4-ring task in the human condition; in Experiment 1 this was 
seen in the solutions containing more steps. The multiple regression results of both 
experiments combined pinpoint that social highlighting behaviors (pointing) in the 
demonstrations may at least partially drive these social interference effects.  
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Table 1 
Multiple Regression for Predicting Four-Ring Solution Time in Experiments 1 and 2 
Variable B SE (B) ß 
Condition 19.43 8.91 .239* 
3-ring solution time 1.49 .312 .681** 
3-ring number of steps -9.19 3.29 -.486* 
Demonstration solution time -.236 .279 -.112 
Demonstration number of steps 5.56 3.44 .223 
Looks -1.74 1.05 -.209 
Points 2.15 1.07 .240* 
*p < .05. **p < .01 
 
Table 2 
Multiple Regression for Predicting Four-Ring Number of Steps in Experiments 1 and 2 
Variable B SE (B) ß 
Condition 3.41 1.75 .236 
3-ring solution time .132 .061 .340* 
3-ring number of steps -.935 .644 -.279 
Demonstration solution time -.062 .055 -.164 
Demonstration number of steps 1.23 .674 .279 
Looks -.423 .207 -.285* 
Points .450 .210 .283* 
*p < .05. **p < .01 
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Experiment 3 
 Before we can conclude that social highlighting of actions interferes with knowledge-
building, an alternative explanation to consider is that the basic act of planning and executing 
a set of pointing behaviors interfered with the planning and execution of the movements 
inherent to the Tower of Hanoi task. Thus, the presence of a social partner induced 
highlighting behaviors that in turn interrupted the participant‘s natural sequence to complete 
the task. On this view, the social/communicative nature of the pointing was not necessary to 
produce interference. Experiment 3 therefore tested whether interrupting one‘s action 
sequence and being forced to point even in a non-social context would raise the cognitive 
load enough to interfere with learning. In this experiment there was never any audience. In 
the Repeat condition participants simply solved the three-ring problem a second time without 
any interruptions. In the Interruption condition, however, every time they heard a beep they 
had to point at the ring they were going to next pick up. If they were holding a ring they 
pointed to the one they were holding, and then to where they were going to move it. If the 
basic disruptiveness of pointing is primarily responsible for the decreased learning in the 
human conditions in the previous experiments, participants in the Interruption condition 
should do worse on the 4-ring problem.  
Method 
Participants 
Out of 57 Vanderbilt undergraduates who participated, 5 were excluded for prior 
experience solving Tower of Hanoi problems, 3 for violating the rules of the task, and 5 for 
failing to solve the 4-ring task within six minutes. This left 44 participants (22 in each 
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condition) who completed the experiment in exchange for class credit (Mean age = 20.7 
years, 35 females).  
Procedure 
 The same procedure as in Experiment 1 was used to introduce participants to the 
Tower of Hanoi task. After participants solved the 3-ring task for the first time, in the Repeat 
condition the experimenter simply instructed participants to solve the task a second time, and 
went behind the screen. In the Interruption condition participants were instructed to solve the 
task a second time, but while they were doing this, they were told to listen for a beep that 
would occur periodically. Whenever they heard the beep, the instructions were to point at the 
ring they were going to pick up next, or the one they were already holding, and then point to 
where they were going to move it (If they had to think about their next move long enough 
that the next beep occurred before they produced their points, their instructions were to only 
start responding to points again after completing their current points and step). A rate of 
beeping (1 beep per 10s) was chosen to generate a comparable mean number points for 
participants in the Interruption condition (M=5.95) as participants in the Human conditions 
of Experiment 1 and 2 (Ms =5.27 & 6.55).  After giving these instructions the experimenter 
pressed a button on the laptop to start the beep-presenting movie file and then went behind 
the screen. After participants completed the 3-ring task the second time, the experimenter 
presented them with the 4-ring task as in Experiment 1. 
A preliminary check on participants‘ solution time and number of steps for the three-
ring problem was again made. Participants in the Repeat and Interruption conditions did not 
reliably differ, ts (42) < 1.65, n.s. 
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Results and Discussion 
Participants in the Repeat and Interruption conditions did not significantly differ in 
the time they took to solve the 4-ring tower of Hanoi problem, t (42) =.03, p =.98. 
Additionally, there was a trend of fewer rather than more 4-ring steps for participants in the 
Interruption vs. Repeat conditions, t (42) = 1.51, p =.14, with a marginally significant task by 
condition interaction, F (1,42) = 3.11, p =.08. See Figures 12 and 13. This demonstrates that 
the results from Experiments 1 and 2 were not due to participants in the human condition 
having a generally higher cognitive load as a result of having to interrupt their action 
sequence more. Rather, these results are specific to social pointing. 
 
Chapter III Discussion 
 These experiments converge on the conclusion that demonstrating to a social agent 
can interfere with learning-by-teaching, and imply that social highlighting behaviors are tied 
to this effect. Furthermore, while some responses elicited by the mere presence of a passive 
social agent, such as looking at the agent, may be tied to facilitating learning, social 
highlighting behaviors appear to generate interference effects that overwhelm such 
facilitation effects. It appears that there is at least an initial cost to demonstrating actions with 
social highlighting, which impedes rather than facilitates one‘s own learning if it occurs in 
the absence of interactions with the agent. This suggests the need to consider the sources of 
the potential costs of demonstrating a task with social highlighting, and to try to figure out 
what it is about the subsequent interactions that in most learning-by-teaching situations 
channel these costs into benefits. 
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Research aimed at parsing what occurs in learning-by-teaching situations has 
demonstrated that behaviors and verbalizations by both the tutor and the learner can promote 
or fail to promote learning by either party. A fundamental distinction is between knowledge-
telling and knowledge-building tutor behaviors (Roscoe & Chi, 2007). Knowledge-telling 
constitutes reiterating the basic factual information one knows about a subject, which might 
include asking the learner questions geared at assessing such raw knowledge. It is through 
knowledge-building behaviors, however, that the robust effects of learning-by-teaching often 
occur. During knowledge-building, tutors go beyond simply reciting their knowledge, to 
actively inferring new ideas, making links between different areas of knowledge, reflecting 
on what they know and don‘t know, and locating and correcting errors and inadequacies in 
their understanding.  
In understanding how such cognitions and behaviors might generate learning in the 
teacher, it is helpful to situate them within a general framework that defines and organizes 
the different kinds of learning behaviors one can engage in. Chi (2009) distinguishes between 
passive, active, constructive, and interactive learning behaviors. During passive learning, the 
learner might just listen to the tutor‘s explanation of the subject being studied without 
making any overt replies. However, if the learner repeats the tutor‘s statements, or shifts gaze 
in response to highlighting actions from the tutor, these would be examples of active learning 
behaviors. These activities engage the learner‘s attention to better encode new information. If 
the learner goes beyond encoding explicitly presented information, he may actually engage in 
deeper inferences about this knowledge, and thereby generate new knowledge. In such a 
case, the learner is engaging in constructive learning behaviors. Finally, if two learning 
partners argue about the concepts being learned, incorporating and building on each other‘s 
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separate knowledge to jointly construct new knowledge, they are engaging in interactive 
learning. According to this model interactive learning behaviors should always result in 
deeper and better learning than constructive behaviors, which will always be better for 
learning than active behaviors, which will always be better for learning than passive 
behaviors (Chi, 2009). While this framework was developed with a focus on what the person 
being taught learns, we can also apply it to understanding how learning-by-teaching works. 
We can distinguish greater or lesser degrees of activeness (i.e., knowledge-telling) in the 
tutor‘s behaviors from constructive (i.e., knowledge-building) tutor behaviors, as well as 
considering interactive behaviors in analyzing the factors impacting tutor learning. 
The current results indicate that when the tutor‘s demonstration behaviors to a social 
agent are restricted mainly to active, knowledge-building behaviors, this actually decreases 
the tutor‘s capacity to learn, relative to a more passive demonstration for a non-social agent. 
These findings suggest that using one‘s inferences about a social agent‘s lack of knowledge, 
in order to calculate which actions to socially highlight, occupies cognitive resources that 
otherwise could be used to improve one‘s own learning. This effortful reasoning impedes 
one‘s learning when not supported with other, constructive learning behaviors.  
The LOE framework offers a way to describe how people represent a social agent‘s 
knowledge to highlight actions, and how this aspect of demonstrating a task for a social agent 
might impede deep encoding. The cost stems from the simulative and theory-level reasoning 
used to represent the problem from the perspective of a task-naive social agent. This includes 
inhibiting one‘s own knowledge in order to first simulate reasoning out the solution from the 
agent‘s perspective. As outlined earlier, both inhibiting one‘s knowledge, and using one‘s 
inferences about what the social agent knows to adjust one‘s representation of the solution 
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are effortful, non-automatic processes requiring the use of working memory resources (cf. 
Epley et al., 2004; Lin, Keysar, & Epley, 2010). By the simulative reasoning route the 
teacher constructs an event model of the learner‘s potential actions to imagine places in the 
problem where the learner might at first do the wrong thing if not given instruction. By the 
theory-level reasoning route the teacher might mentally denote particular steps as 
counterintuitive and therefore logically infer that it makes sense to highlight them. The point 
is, whether the tutor is using one or both routes, in the current experiments he may be pushed 
in his demonstration to switch back and forth between his own representation of the solution 
and his event model incorporating the learner‘s representation, but he is not pushed to 
actually compare the two representations. The costs to the tutor‘s learning arise from this 
switching, and from the occupation of simulative and theory-resources needed to represent 
the learner‘s knowledge in the first place. Due to the need of inhibiting what one knows to 
use one‘s representation of the human agent‘s lack of knowledge, producing such 
highlighting behaviors may therefore lead the tutor to have less access to his or her 
knowledge for the purpose of building on it while demonstrating. Rather, the tutor may be 
more inclined to touch on what he or she already knows at the surface level while producing 
knowledge-telling highlighting behaviors (Roscoe & Chi, 2007). In the Tower of Hanoi 
demonstration context, this means that with increased social highlighting the tutor will have a 
lowered capacity to develop a representation of the task in terms of an abstract rule like a 
recursive or subtower based strategy, the representation instead being more likely to stay on 
the trial-and-error level (see Simon, 1975). 
Adding constructive and interactive knowledge-building behaviors into the mix, 
however, turns these costly processes into something useful for the tutor‘s learning. One 
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consideration is that such behaviors are much more likely to encourage metacognition 
(Roscoe & Chi, 2007). Metacognition refers to the monitoring of one‘s own knowledge states 
and learning (Flavell, 1979; Kuhn, 2000). Metacognition has been established as essential for 
robust, deep learning of generalizable knowledge, and interactive learning situations produce 
significantly more metacognition in both the tutor and the learner than non-interactive 
learning situations (e.g., Aleven & Koedinger, 2002; VanLehn, Siler, Murray, Yamauchi, & 
Baggett, 2003; Wagster, Tan, Wu, Biswas, & Schwartz, 2007). In terms of the LOE 
framework, metacognition is a theory-level reasoning process. It involves explicitly labeling 
one‘s own versus another‘s knowledge states, including how and how well one knows what 
one knows. In the current context, such reasoning may be instrumental in pushing the tutor to 
compare his representation of the solution to his event model incorporating the social agent‘s 
representation. Thus it would push the tutor to use both theory and simulative reasoning not 
only to superficially highlight elements of his knowledge of the solution in his 
demonstration, but to compare his knowledge to the social agent‘s developing knowledge. 
This would drive him to understand at a more abstract level why, for example, a given 
intuitive step in the task would lead to a failure. Thus the tutor would go beyond highlighting 
his knowledge to actually refining and changing it, and the resulting generalized 
representation of the solution would be more readily applicable to transfer into a solution of a 
more difficult version of the problem. However, as these experiments show, situations that 
trigger social highlighting without further triggering metacognition appear to place more 
costs than benefits for developing a deeper representation of the action. 
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CHAPTER IV  
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
 The main goal of this research was to investigate differences and connections 
between automatic simulation processes and more consciously controlled, flexible simulation 
along with the non-simulative reasoning built on top of it that all occur in our processing of 
social agents. Investigating these distinct kinds of action analysis processes suggested 
different routes for representing a social agent‘s higher-level, abstract knowledge vs. lower-
level, perceptual knowledge. They also suggested possible refinements and modifications to 
my LOE framework, as well as other models of action analysis that have been proposed, that 
would be useful to consider. 
 
Deliberate vs. Unconscious Event Models 
The action demonstration experiments indicated that generating social highlighting 
cues, i.e., points, can be cognitively demanding, impeding one‘s own deeper learning of the 
task one is trying to teach to a social agent via the points. As some evidence suggests that 
even from infancy humans produce points to influence the knowledge states of a social other 
(e.g., Liszkowski, Carpenter, & Tomasello, 2008; Tomasello, Carpenter, & Liszkowski, 
2007), and likewise calculate the other‘s knowledge states to interpret points (Southgate, 
Chevallier, & Csibra, 2010), such mentalistic reasoning may be difficult to separate from any 
act of social pointing, even to a non-interactive audience. In other words, social pointing 
always involves representing the knowledge states of a social other, at least to some extent. 
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This element of calculating which objects and actions to socially highlight, and/or producing 
the points for the purpose of influencing the other‘s knowledge states, may be a main factor 
that can impede one‘s learning in this context. 
 In the LOE framework, theory-level processes are able to calculate which features of 
a task someone lacking experience might not know about, and on this basis which actions it 
makes sense to highlight through pointing, via domain-general reasoning. For example, one 
might reason while demonstrating the optimal 3-ring Tower of Hanoi solution, that a person 
who has never done the task before might not realize the subgoal of clearing the top two 
rings from the first pole while leaving the goal pole open for the largest ring. He might 
indicate this by pointing first at the bottom ring, then at the goal pole. Then he might indicate 
the subgoal to this subgoal by pointing at the top two rings and then pointing to the middle 
pole. These kinds of calculations of which pointing behaviors to execute occur at the theory-
level because, since in the LOE framework theory-level reasoning involves both the correct 
explicit mental state concepts as well as the knowledge and executive functions necessary for 
deliberate inferential reasoning on the basis of these concepts.  
This aspect of the LOE framework fits with theories and research highlighting 
domain-general reasoning capacities as critical to social reasoning. For instance, while 
children‘s failure on particular tasks involving reasoning about others‘ false-beliefs had 
originally been taken as evidence they lack the concept of belief, more extensive testing with 
alternate versions of the task seems to indicate they have the concept but lack the full 
capacity to always reason out the correct inferences with the concept (Bloom & German, 
2000). Furthermore, it is possible to train children lacking the ability to pass these tasks to do 
so merely by giving them training to understand sentences holding embedded clauses 
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(Lohmann & Tomasello, 2003). I would argue this finding provides support for the notion of 
domain general learning supporting one‘s theory of mind reasoning abilities, in that learning 
a grammatical structure separate from a theory of mind reasoning task improves one‘s 
reasoning abilities in the latter.  
Other domain general mechanisms related to theory-level reasoning are tied more 
directly to brain maturation. One view is that a growing capacity to inhibit one‘s knowledge 
of the true-belief location in a false-belief task may account for age-related improvements in 
performance on false-belief tasks. (Leslie, Friedman, & German, 2004). In the LOE 
framework, inhibitory processes play a role both at the theory level and the imaginative 
simulative reasoning level of action analysis. 
One consideration regarding my explanation of these experiments in terms of event 
models, is that there are some differences between how event models function in the LOE 
framework, versus from where the concept was originated (Zacks et al., 2007). As they were 
originally conceived, there doesn‘t appear to be room for deliberate, conscious construction 
of event models. Rather they all arise and work automatically and unconsciously in the 
perceptual processing and understanding of actions. In the LOE framework, event models at 
the level of sensorimotor simulation function in such automatic fashion. But there is also 
room for conscious, deliberate constructing of event models at the higher levels. As in the 
proposal of emulators for action perception and prediction by Grush (2004), certain stimuli 
may drive the system automatically, but it can also be run ―offline,‖ that is, deliberately 
through imagination. 
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Limitations in Automatic Sensorimotor Simulation 
The LOE framework suggests that sensorimotor simulation should automatically 
occur whenever one observes actions one is capable of producing. This is in line with a wide 
body of experimental evidence, as outlined in the introduction. This notion of automatic 
sensorimotor simulation lines up closely with the proposal that we directly perceive, rather 
than infer others‘ motor intentions. According to this account, at the most basic level we 
experience our own and others‘ intentions in the same way, due to the overlapping 
sensorimotor brain areas for representing our own and others‘ actions. For example, if we see 
an arm moving toward a door to open it, we see first the ―naked‖ intention to open the door, 
with separate, non-overlapping brain processes to determine if the intention is one‘s own or 
someone else‘s (Jeannerod, 2004). The evidence reviewed by Jeannerod (2004) supports this 
account by discussing experimental situations and psychopathological conditions leading to 
errors in intention attribution, causing subjects both to attribute their own intention to another 
agent and vice-versa. The idea is we don‘t go through any inferential processes to figure out 
what others‘ motor intentions are. We directly perceive them, directly experiencing them the 
same way we experience our own. What is not directly perceived is whether the intention is 
our own or not. Therefore, sensorimotor simulation processes result in associated effects 
being bound up into our perceptual representations of motor acts. When we see a goal-
directed motor act these processes entail automatic perceptual prediction of the goal. 
 In the gaze and reach observation experiments, while I searched for a way to 
delineate this kind of automatic sensorimotor simulation for basic motor act perception from 
simulative reasoning about a social agent‘s perceptual knowledge states, I could only find 
clear evidence of the former kind of simulation. Although it is difficult to provide an 
 86 
interpretation that relies to some extent on null findings, the system for simulating reaches 
based on observed gaze cues does not appear from these results to take as input an inference 
of what the observed actor knows from his or her gaze. Rather, it appears to be constrained in 
the kind of input needed for activation, failing to activate properly in situations where non-
graspable objects play a role in the observed actions, but given the right kind of input 
automatically generates a simulation of the motor parameters of the observed or projected 
reach.  
 This interpretation of this set of findings raises a puzzle, however. Since according to 
the LOE framework, and proposals like that of Wilson & Knoblich (2005), automatic motor 
simulation is instrumental in our basic perception of motor acts, its apparent failure raises the 
question of how it can fail and what processes take over in such circumstances to guide our 
perception. Apparently, the sensorimotor system either fails to run, or it runs in too 
confounded a manner to provide a clear cut precise simulation that would be useful for online 
perceptual prediction, in certain circumstances. The experiments in Chapter 2 suggest these 
circumstances might include occurrences of the actor gazing through a non-graspable object 
(whether transparent or opaque), and also when the actor‘s gaze is ambiguous and not 
disambiguated by a reach. If indeed a failure of sensorimotor simulation explains these 
findings, such circumstances would be similar to the perception of robot arm reaches, or 
potential human arm reaches minus any gaze cues, in that sensorimotor simulation does not 
seem to occur in such circumstances as well  (Castiello, 2003). The system may also fail to 
simulate observed reach trajectories around a barrier when this barrier is not in the observer‘s 
own peripersonal space, but otherwise run this simulation automatically when observing the 
other‘s reach (Griffiths & Tipper, 2009). Therefore, the sensorimotor simulation system 
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seems constrained in the kind of input that effectively activates it. The system may work best 
for simple motor acts executed in typical, unambiguous ways, and it may sometimes also 
require that the observed action be one that the observer could potentially execute while in 
the context of the immediate environment.  
 Since in the LOE framework deliberate simulative reasoning is built out of the 
processes supporting sensorimotor simulation, if the latter is blocked from perceptually 
guiding a given observed motor act, so too is the former. This leaves theory-level reasoning, 
in other words logical inference, as the process guiding our action perception in these 
circumstances of sensorimotor simulation failure. That is even though we‘re talking about 
simple motor acts toward goal objects, where representing the actor‘s mental states is not 
needed, theory-level reasoning is the only guide of one‘s perception of the action if the 
sensorimotor simulation route is closed. In other words, when the visual input deviates from 
what the sensorimotor simulation system can handle, we can‘t ―directly perceive‖ 
(Jeannerod, 2004) what is going on. Instead, we must deliberately infer what we are seeing. 
In this light, experiments testing the kind of input the mirror neuron system can handle have 
started to suggest limitations on the level of action understanding they can account for 
(Brass, Schmitt, Spengler, & Gergely, 2007; Kilner & Frith, 2008). This research suggests 
that mirror neurons are not involved in understanding actions performed in an atypical 
manner. Rather, brain areas including the anterior frontal medial cortex, involved in higher 
level social reasoning and deliberate inferential processing, are recruited to make sense of 
such actions.  
A chief direction of future research suggested by these considerations is to rigorously 
test whether failures in the sensorimotor simulation system result in higher-level theory-
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based processes coming into play. For instance, according to the LOE framework, if an 
observer is engaging in a logical inferential dual task while observing an unusual action, this 
should interfere with his perceptual prediction of the actor‘s movements. But this 
interference should not occur for stereotyped actions, where the perceptual prediction comes 
automatically through sensorimotor simulation. Such research could provide clear criteria for 
carving out the different processes involved in social reasoning and action perception.  
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